نقد ایدۀ خودفرمانی در کمالگرایی لیبرال «استیون وال»
محورهای موضوعی : Research in Theoritical Politics
افشین خاکباز
1
*
,
سید علیرضا حسینی بهشتی
2
,
سيدعلي محمودي
3
1 - دانشجوی دکتری اندیشه سیاسی دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، ایران
2 - استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، ایران
3 - استاد دانشکده روابط بینالملل وزارت امور خارجه، ایران
کلید واژه: کمالگرایی, کمالگراییستیزی, خودفرمانی, کمالگرایی لیبرال و استیون وال. ,
چکیده مقاله :
در سالهای اخیر، تلاشهای اندیشمندان کمالگرا برای پاسخ به نقدهای حامیان بیطرفی، حکومت کمالگرایی را دوباره در کانون توجه اندیشمندان علوم سیاسی قرار داده است. عمدهترین نقدِ حامیان بیطرفی حکومت، ناسازگاری کمالگرایی با مبانی لیبرالیسم، یعنی خودفرمانی و آزادیهای فردی است. بنابراین بخش زیادی از نوشتههای نوکمالگرایان معطوف به اثبات سازگاری میان کمالگرایی و لیبرالیسم است. از جمله میتوان به «استیون وال» اشاره کرد که مقالات و کتابهای متعددی در زمینه کمالگرایی منتشر کرده و به دنبال یافتن راهی میانه بین بیطرفی تمامعیار و کمالگرایی تمامعیار است. وال با طرح ایدۀ کمالگرایی لیبرال میکوشد تا نشان دهد که نهتنها کمالگرایی در تعارض با خودفرمانی نیست، بلکه خودفرمانی از عناصر اصلی آن است و کمالگرایی، مدافع آزادی است، نه مانعی در برابر آزادی. مقالۀ حاضر با بهرهگیری از روش توصیفی- تحلیلی به بررسی انتقادی مفهوم خودفرمانی و جایگاه آن در کمالگرایی لیبرال استیون وال میپردازد و میکوشد تا معلوم سازد که کمالگرایی لیبرال تا چه حد میتواند دغدغۀ تحدید خودفرمانی و آزادیهای اساسی به دست حکومتهای مدعی کمالگرایی را رفع کند.
A Critique of the Idea of Autonomy in Steven
Wall`s Liberal Perfectionism
Afshin Khakbaz*
Seyyed Alireza Hosseini Beheshti**
Seyyed Ali Mahmoudi***
In recent years, the efforts of perfectionist thinkers to respond to the criticisms of neutrality advocates have brought perfectionist governance back into the spotlight of political science discourse. The main criticism from neutrality advocates is the incompatibility of perfectionism with the foundations of liberalism—namely, autonomy and individual freedoms. Consequently, much of the neo-perfectionist literature is devoted to proving the compatibility between perfectionism and liberalism. Among these thinkers is Steven Wall, who has published numerous articles and books on perfectionism and seeks a middle path between full neutrality and full perfectionism. By proposing the idea of liberal perfectionism, Wall attempts to show that perfectionism is not only compatible with autonomy but that autonomy is one of its core elements, and that perfectionism defends freedom rather than obstructs it. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, critically examines the concept of autonomy and its place in Steven Wall’s liberal perfectionism, aiming to determine to what extent liberal perfectionism can address concerns about the restriction of autonomy and fundamental freedoms by governments claiming perfectionist ideals.
Keywords: Perfectionism, Anti-perfectionism, Autonomy, Liberal Perfectionism, Steven Wall.
Introduction
In recent years, perfectionist thinkers have reignited interest in perfectionism within political science by responding to critiques from neutrality advocates. The central critique is that perfectionism conflicts with liberal principles such as autonomy and individual freedom. Thus, neo-perfectionist writings largely aim to demonstrate compatibility between perfectionism and liberalism. Steven Wall, for example, has published extensively on perfectionism and seeks a middle ground between absolute neutrality and absolute perfectionism. His concept of liberal perfectionism argues that perfectionism does not contradict autonomy; rather, autonomy is a fundamental component of it, and perfectionism supports freedom rather than impedes it.
Since a government's stance on autonomy determines the extent to which it respects fundamental rights and freedoms and allows individuals to pursue their own conception of a good life, reconciling autonomy with perfectionism could not only address neutrality advocates’ concerns about bias in perfectionist governments but also block attempts by such governments to justify restricting autonomy under the guise of promoting perfection.
Research Background and Theoretical Framework
This article uses a descriptive-analytical approach to critically examine the concept of autonomy and its role in Steven Wall’s liberal perfectionism, aiming to assess how effectively liberal perfectionism can address concerns about governments restricting autonomy and basic freedoms.
To this end, it summarizes the views of liberal perfectionist thinkers on autonomy and its boundaries:
- Thomas Hurka’s maximizing consequentialist perfectionism
- William Galston’s pluralist perfectionism, which recognizes a spectrum of virtues rather than a single supreme one
- George Sher’s perfectionism based on reasonable self-restraint, where perfectionist values should neither dominate nor be marginalized
- Vinit Haksar’s non-consequentialist perfectionism, which allows tolerance without equal freedoms
- Joseph Raz’s liberal perfectionism, which argues that governments need not endorse a single conception of the good life but should enable citizens to pursue a wide range of valuable goals and ideals
Steven Wall’s Limited Perfectionism
Steven Wall, compared to classical perfectionists, assigns greater importance to autonomy. His limited perfectionism shares much with Joseph Raz’s liberal perfectionism and rejects full-blown perfectionism. Wall believes perfectionism offers a better account of political morality than anti-perfectionism and that liberal perfectionism has stronger justificatory power than anti-perfectionist liberalism. He questions the necessity of excluding perfectionist considerations from public policy, arguing that concerns such as political stability, respect for autonomy, and equal regard for individuals do not invalidate perfectionist policies. Contrary to anti-perfectionist claims, Wall sees personal autonomy as central to human flourishing in liberal perfectionism. He maintains that while governments need not promote every aspect of the good life, ideals like political stability, respect for autonomy, and equal concern for citizens do not undermine the legitimacy of perfectionist policies and should not be excluded from politics.
Perfectionism and Politics
Wall argues that perfectionism is compatible with limited government and democracy and is not inherently elitist. He believes perfectionists accept value pluralism and the existence of reasonable but conflicting views about the good life, while rejecting value nihilism. They are typically neither committed to Plato’s philosopher-king nor to John Stuart Mill’s radical pluralism, but see political institutions as tools for advancing substantive moral goals.
Limited vs. Universal Perfectionism
Wall introduces the concept of limited governmental neutrality based on value pluralism—the acceptance of diverse and reasonable yet incompatible values instead of a single value system. He presents limited perfectionism as a middle path between absolute neutrality and universal perfectionism. This approach aligns with perfectionists’ goal of promoting the good life while also addressing neutrality advocates’ concern about the incompatibility of perfectionism with autonomy. What distinguishes Wall’s limited perfectionism from universal perfectionism is its acceptance of multiple fully good ways of living and the belief that no single way of life holds a privileged status in all contexts.
Limited Perfectionism and Autonomy
Autonomy plays a central role in Wall’s political ethics. He defines autonomous individuals as those who actively and consciously take responsibility for their lives and are not subject to coercion or excessive manipulation. Autonomy is not synonymous with the good life but is one of its essential elements. Wall argues that political authorities should create and maintain social conditions that maximize the possibility for citizens to pursue autonomous lives.
Requirements of Autonomy
Wall contends that full autonomy is unattainable in real-world conditions and is not a suitable goal for political theory. He identifies several factors that limit autonomy: not everyone possesses the mental resilience and perseverance to choose life plans and honor commitments; not all lifestyles require planning; and autonomy can be constrained by coercion (limiting choices) and manipulation (altering preferences).
Rejection of Autonomy as Absolute Good
Wall sees autonomy as a necessary component of the good life but not its sole criterion or an absolute good. Autonomy is a conditional good and loses its value if it serves the development of undesirable traits.
Rejection of Maximizing Autonomy
Wall considers full autonomy an ideal and unattainable. He believes autonomy exists in degrees and opposes efforts to maximize it, arguing that focusing on one aspect of autonomy may hinder its development in another. Increasing the number of autonomous individuals and deepening autonomy may sometimes conflict, making the principle of maximizing autonomy problematic.
Rejection of the Non-Discrimination Argument
Wall also rejects the non-discrimination argument. While acknowledging that government decisions, like market forces, can alter opportunity costs, he argues such actions are necessary to prevent chaos and are only objectionable if they favor certain lifestyles over others. He asserts that governments must not only create legal frameworks to facilitate autonomous growth but also actively promote autonomy, which requires supporting certain lifestyles over others. Perfectionism involves both promoting good and preventing bad, so such discrimination does not conflict with autonomy.
Evaluation of Wall’s Views
Wall implicitly undermines the intrinsic value of autonomy by deeming it worthless without connection to other elements of the good life, thereby opening the door to government restrictions on autonomy. Limiting autonomy’s value to cases that promote desirable personal development—without specifying who determines desirability—has similar implications. Moreover, Wall does not define the limits of coercion and force in government actions, leaving room for abuse and encroachment on personal autonomy. He also seems to hold stereotypical views of non-Western societies, restricting the value of autonomy to Western contexts and overlooking the fact that silence or lack of protest in non-Western societies often stems from fear of repression, not genuine consent. This article also critiques Wall’s rejection of maximizing autonomy and his defense of government manipulation of opportunity costs, offering suggestions to improve his limited perfectionism.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the article concludes that although Wall’s theory of liberal perfectionism suffers from major flaws and contradictions, it is a valuable first step in the right direction. By embracing the value of autonomy, Wall attempts to reconcile liberalism and perfectionism. However, by linking autonomy to valuable goals and lifestyles, he introduces a contradiction that undermines this aim and reduces autonomy to a secondary value. Fundamental questions—such as who determines the value of different lifestyles and the permissible extent of government intervention to support specific conceptions of the good life—remain unanswered. Thus, Wall fails to adequately address neutrality advocates’ core concern about unchecked government interference in individuals’ lives under the guise of promoting valuable lifestyles.
References
Galston, W. A. (2004) Liberal pluralism: The implications of value pluralism for political theory and practice. Cambridge University Press.
Haksar, V. (1979) Equality, liberty and perfectionism. Oxford University Press.
Hurka, T. (1996) Perfectionism. Oxford University Press.
Macedo, S. (n.d.). Liberal virtues. In S. Wall & G. Klosko (Eds.), Perfectionism and neutrality (pp. xx–xx). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. (Replace "xx–xx" with actual page numbers if available, and update "n.d." with the year if known.)
Raz, J. (1994) Ethics in the public domain: Essays in the morality of law and politics. Clarendon Press.
Sher, G. (1997) Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics. Cambridge University Press.
Wall, S. (1998) Liberalism, perfectionism, and restraint. Cambridge University Press.
* Corresponding Author: Ph.D Student in Political Thought, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran.
*** Professor, Faculty of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran.
Galston, William A. (2004) Liberal Pluralism: The Implications of Value Pluralism for Political theory and Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Haksar, Vinit (1979) Equality, Liberty and Perfectionism, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Hurka, Thomas (1996) Perfectionism, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Macedo, Stephen (2011) ”Leberal Virtues” ed. Steven Wall & George Klosko. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, n.d.
Raz, Joseph (1994) Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in Morality of Law and Politics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Sher, George (1997) Beyound Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, Cambridge University Press.
Wall, Steven (1998) Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint, Cambridge University Press.