مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922Iranian Identity in the Struggle of Internal Conflicts in Ferdowsi's Shahnamehهویت ایرانی در کشاکش تقابلات درونی در شاهنامه فردوسی140faشجاعاحمدونداستاد گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران محمد عبدالخانیدانشجوی دکتری علوم سیاسی (اندیشه سیاسی)، دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران 2025211Iranian Identity in the Struggle of Internal Conflicts in Ferdowsi's Shahnameh   Shoja Ahmadvand<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Mohammad Abdolkhani <a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a>   This study demonstrates that the issue of national identity for Ferdowsi is conceptualized within the framework of a “self–self” confrontation, and he examines the problem of “Iranian–Iranian conflicts.” The central research question asks how Ferdowsi redefines Iranian identity not in the encounter with the foreign, but within the context of internal conflicts. The study hypothesizes that Ferdowsi, by critiquing the political and social conditions of his time, regards internal conflicts as the primary factor undermining Iranian identity. Accordingly, and drawing on Quentin Skinner’s intentionalist methodology, the study employs thematic analysis of selected narratives from the Shahnameh to develop an understanding of Iranian identity based on intra-Iranian confrontation. This research is innovative in two respects: first, it examines national identity from the perspective of “self–self” confrontation; second, it demonstrates how addressing this issue and its potential resolutions contributes to the reconstruction of contemporary Iranian identity.   Keywords: political thought, Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, self–self confrontation, Iranian identity, prevailing norm.   Introduction Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, as one of the most foundational texts of Iranian identity, has consistently been a focal point for scholars of Iranian culture and political thought. In most existing studies, Iranian identity in the Shahnameh has primarily been examined through the lens of the “self–other” dichotomy, while the role of internal conflicts has received comparatively little attention. This research gap has limited our understanding of the complexities surrounding Iranian identity. The main objective of this study is to revisit the concept of Iranian identity in the Shahnameh, focusing on internal confrontations and analyzing their role in weakening national identity. The principal research question is: How does Ferdowsi, through the narratives of the Shahnameh, raise the issue of Iranian identity not merely in relation to foreign others (self–other), but within the context of internal conflicts (self–self)? The study hypothesizes that Ferdowsi, by critiquing the political and social realities of his time, identifies internal conflicts as the principal factor undermining Iranian identity. Accordingly, the aim of this research is to offer a novel reading of the Shahnameh, in which intra-Iranian struggles emerge as a key element in the fragility and vulnerability of national identity.   Literature Review A review of previous studies on “Iranian identity” in general, and the conceptualization of the “self” in the Shahnameh specifically, indicates that conventional readings have largely centered on a few primary approaches, which this study critiques: 2.1. Epic readings based on self–other cultural confrontation, emphasizing mythological and antiquarian elements, such as the works of Zabihollah Safa (1954; 1976) and Theodor Nöldeke (1990), influenced by the Pahlavi discourse and its legitimizing policies. 2.2. Leftist readings, particularly Farajollah Mizani-Javanshir (1980), which, through a Marxist lens, critique the monarchy-centered ideology in the Shahnameh and interpret internal conflicts in terms of social and political contradictions. 2.3. Realist readings, which examine “confrontation” as an intrinsic reality of political life in the Shahnameh, attempting to analyze political order and stability in Ferdowsi’s thought; for example, Baqer Parham (1994) interprets the Shahnameh as a book of Iranian politics. Despite these major approaches, studies of Iranian identity have predominantly focused on the concept of the “self” in relation to the “other.” Analysis of key works—including Mohammad Ali Eslami Nadooshan’s Life and Death of Heroes in the Shahnameh (1969), Shahrokh Maskub’s The Mourning of Siavash (1972), Kurt Heinrich Hansen’s The Shahnameh: Structure and Form (1995), Mohammad Amin Riyahi’s Ferdowsi: His Life, Thought, and Poetry (1996), Morteza Thaqibfar’s Ferdowsi and the Philosophy of Iranian History (1998), Riyahi’s The Origins of Ferdowsi Studies (2003), Maskub’s Armaghan-e Mor: An Inquiry into the Shahnameh (2005), Abolfazl Khatibi’s Iranian Identity in the Shahnameh (2006), and Fereshteh Saber Latibari & Negar Davari Ardakani’s Self and Other in the Written Heritage of Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh (2020)—reveals that prior research has concentrated predominantly on confrontation with external others, paying limited attention to internal conflicts from Ferdowsi’s critical perspective. Hence, this study is innovative in that it first examines Iranian identity through the lens of internal confrontations and second, demonstrates how understanding these confrontations contributes to the reconstruction of contemporary Iranian identity. As such, it serves as a critical approach to political action in the Iranian tradition, offering pathways for future research.   Methodology This study is grounded in the premise that political thought is shaped by its cognitive context; thus, examining Ferdowsi’s political thought requires situating it in relation to his temporal context, or, in other words, the prevailing norms of his era. Drawing on Quentin Skinner’s intentionalist theoretical framework and employing thematic analysis, this research examines selected narratives from the Shahnameh to reconstruct the historical context and prevailing norms of Ferdowsi’s time, elucidate his critical approach, and analyze the dimensions and consequences of internal conflicts for Iranian identity. In other words, the study moves beyond purely text-centered or context-centered analyses to interpret the themes of the Shahnameh narratives and uncover Ferdowsi’s ultimate intentions. Findings The findings indicate that Ferdowsi presents the issue of Iranian identity in the Shahnameh, behind diverse narratives of confrontation and persistent struggles, through the lens of internal conflicts—what can be termed a “self–self” confrontation. These internal conflicts are depicted as epic and tragic battles among Iranian heroes. The thematic analysis of selected narratives shows that internal conflicts stemming from ignorance, revenge, betrayal, deceit, violence, filicide, murder, and factional divergence among Iranian groups create profound social, cultural, and identity struggles, the destructive consequences of which are reflected in the cohesion and continuity of national identity. These confrontations represent chronic tensions in Iranian society, arising from ethnic, religious, and political rivalries, and portray the chaotic condition and fragmentation of national identity (Espuler, 1998: 57–77). Another finding, employing Skinnerian intentionalist hermeneutics to examine the influence of cognitive context on Ferdowsi’s political thought, reveals that while the prevailing norm of his time attributed the decline of Iranian identity to external threats and foreign cultural influence, Ferdowsi presented the problem of Iranian identity within the framework of internal disruption caused by inter-ethnic and inter-dynastic struggles. Thus, contrary to the dominant view that collapse resulted from self–other confrontation, Ferdowsi frames the weakening of Iranian identity through self–self confrontation. Discussion and Implications The study demonstrates that Ferdowsi, through the epic and mythological narrative structure of the Shahnameh, examines the harms inflicted upon national identity by ethnic, class, religious, and political conflicts—collectively understood as internal confrontations. The thematic analysis reveals how generational struggles, elite rivalries, and violent ethnic and political conflicts can ignite fissures and fragmentation within national identity. In addition to its historical dimension, the research emphasizes the role of prevailing norms and political-cultural interventions during Ferdowsi’s time. During the Ghaznavid reign, characterized by ethnic, religious, and cultural policies, Iranian identity structures faced serious challenges. Patronage of eulogistic poets, the reproduction of self–other dualities, and the promotion of divisive ethnic and religious identities were elements of governance (Khalatbari & Naseri Rad, 2003: 78). In this complex context, Ferdowsi composed the Shahnameh to critique the prevailing situation. Conclusion By introducing the concept of internal confrontation in the Shahnameh, this study shows that Ferdowsi, responding to the problem of Iranian identity decline, identifies intra-Iranian struggles and rivalries as the primary threat to national identity. Drawing on epic storytelling and myth-making, and rooted in Iran’s civilizational and cultural heritage, Ferdowsi seeks to address the issue of Iranian identity through a critical reinterpretation of historical and epic narratives. Accordingly, the Shahnameh emerges not merely as a literary or epic work but as a critical project highlighting the role of internal conflicts in weakening and fragmenting a unified national identity. The study also proposes several strategies for strengthening and preserving contemporary Iranian national identity: 2.4. Scientific and rational identification of the historical and cultural roots of internal conflicts as potential identity vulnerabilities. 2.5. Achieving balanced, comprehensive, and impartial interpretations of Iranian history and culture. 2.6. Evaluating the positive and negative elements of “cultural others” fairly and drawing on their constructive aspects. 2.7. Expanding intergenerational, cultural, and religious dialogue to foster internal cohesion and national solidarity. Ultimately, the preservation and enhancement of a unified Iranian identity depend on fostering a climate of interaction, tolerance, and acceptance of internal diversity, which ensures social and political cohesion.   References Eslami Nadooshan, M. A. (1969) Zendegi va marg-e pahlavanan dar Shahnameh. Tehran: Anjoman-e Asar-e Melli. [In Persian/Farsi] Espuler, B. (1998) Tarikh-e Iran dar qorun-e nokhostin-e Eslami (M. Mirahmadi & A. Falaturi, Trans.; 1st ed.). Tehran: Elmi va Farhangi. [In Persian/Farsi] Parham, B. (1994) Ba negah-e Ferdowsi: Mabani-ye naqd-e khord-e siasi dar Iran. Tehran: Markaz. [In Persian/Farsi] Khatibi, A. (2006) Hoviat-e Irani dar Shahnameh. Nameh-ye Farhangestan, 8(4), 69–76. [In Persian/Farsi] Khalatbari, E., & Naseri Rad, M. (2003) Mahiyat-e siasi-ye hozur-e sha’aran dar darbâr-e Ghaznaviyan. Pazhuheshnameh-ye Olum-e Ensani, 38(1), 63–85. SID: <a href="https://sid.ir/paper/395069/fa">https://sid.ir/paper/395069/fa</a> [In Persian/Farsi] Riyahi, M. A. (1996) Ferdowsi: Zendegi, andishe va she’r-e ou. Tehran: Sokhan. [In Persian/Farsi] Riyahi, M. A. (2003) Sarcheshmeh-ha-ye Ferdowsi-shenasi (2nd ed.). Tehran: Pazhooheshgah-e Olum-e Ensani va Motale’at-e Farhangi. [In Persian/Farsi] Saber Latibari, F., & Davari Ardakani, N. (2020) Khod va digari dar miras-e maktoub-e Shahnameh-ye Ferdowsi (negahi be dastan-e Bijan va Manijeh). Motale’at-e Asnad-e Miras-e Farhangi, 3(2), 76–105. [In Persian/Farsi] Safa, Z. (1954) Hameh-sara’i dar Iran. Tehran: Pirooz. [In Persian/Farsi] Safa, Z. (1976) Sokhani darbare-ye Shahnameh, Ferdowsi va adabiyat-e hameh-i. Tehran: Soroush. [In Persian/Farsi] Ferdowsi, A. (2007) Shahnameh (J. Khaleghi Motlagh, Ed.). Tehran: Markaz-e Dâera-olma’aref-e Bozorg-e Eslami. [In Persian/Farsi] Maskub, S. (1972) Sog-e Siavash: dar marg va rastakhiz (2nd ed.). Tehran: Kharazmi. [In Persian/Farsi] Maskub, S. (2005) Armaghan-e Mor: Jostari dar Shahnameh (1st ed.). Tehran: Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Mizani, F. (Javanshir) (1980) Hameh-ye dad: Bahsi dar mohtavay-e siasi-ye Shahnameh. Tehran: Hezb-e Tudeh. [In Persian/Farsi] Nöldeke, T. (1990) Hameh-ye melli-ye Iran (B. Alavi, Trans.). Tehran: Sepehr. [In Persian/Farsi] Hansen, K. H. (1995) Shahnameh-ye Ferdowsi: Sakhtar va Qaleb (K. Jahandari, Trans.). Tehran: Farzan Rouz. [In Persian/Farsi] Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979) An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.     <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Corresponding Author: Professor, Department of Political Science, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran. ahmadvand@atu.ac.ir <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> Ph.D Student in Political Science (Political Thought), Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran. mohamadabdolkhani@gmail.comاین پژوهش نشان می&zwnj;دهد که مسئله هویت ملی برای فردوسی در چارچوب تقابل «خود- خود» تبیین شده و او به بررسی مسئله «تقابل&zwnj;های ایرانی- ایرانی» پرداخته است. پرسش اصلی پژوهش این است که فردوسی چگونه مسئله هویت ایرانی را نه در مواجهه با بیگانه، بلکه در بستر تقابل&zwnj;های درونی بازتعریف می&zwnj;کند. فرضیه پژوهش آن است که فردوسی با نقد وضعیت سیاسی و اجتماعی عصر خود، تقابل&zwnj;های درونی را عامل اصلی تضعیف هویت ایرانی می&zwnj;داند. در این راستا و با بهره&zwnj;گیری از روش&zwnj;شناسی قصدگرای «کوئنتین اسکینر» و از طریق تحلیل مضمون داستان&zwnj;های منتخب شاهنامه به &zwnj;دنبال ارائه فهمی از مسئله هویت ایرانی بر مبنای تقابل خودی با خودی است. این پژوهش از این جهت نوآورانه به نظر می&zwnj;آید که نخست، مسئله هویت ملی را از منظر تقابل «خود- خود» بررسی می&zwnj;کند؛ دوم اینکه اثر تبیین این مسئله و راه&zwnj;حل&zwnj;های آن را در بازآفرینی هویت ایران امروز نشان می&zwnj;دهد.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/49459

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922Iranian Liberatory Praxis in the Thought of Malkum-Khanپراکسیس رهایی‌بخشِ ایرانی در اندیشۀ «ملکم‌خان»4170faسید حسین اطهریدانشیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد، مشهد، ایران 0000-00001-7332-4848 احسان مزدخواهدانشجوی دکتری علوم سیاسی (گرایش مسائل ایران)، ،دانشگاه فردوسی مشهد ایران20231213Iranian Liberatory Praxis in the Thought of Malkum-Khan   Seyyed Hossein Athari<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Ehsan Mozdkhah<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a> Mirza Malkum-Khan Nāzem al-Dowleh (1212–1287 SH / 1833–1908 CE) is among the most prominent intellectuals of the Iranian Constitutional Era. His political thought has primarily been interpreted within the framework of historiography of contemporary Iranian ideas. Examination of his ideas demonstrates that Malkum-Khan sought to liberate Iran from despotism, stagnation, and backwardness. This study analyzes his thought using a conceptual approach grounded in critical realism and a semantically oriented methodology. Such an approach represents an effort to understand reality and respond to Iran’s two-century-long historical question: “What is to be done?”—a question addressed by every intellectual, including Malkum-Khan—which in turn enables a deeper comprehension of political and social thought in modern Iran. Within this framework, Malkum-Khan’s response to the fundamental question “What is to be done?” is examined across the domains of politics, economics, and culture, with critical realism serving as the analytical lens. The outcome of this study illuminates new dimensions of Malkum-Khan’s political thought and reveals a discernible notion of governance embedded in his ideas.   Keywords: Typology, Critical Realism, Mirza Malkum-Khan, Iranian Liberation, Iran.   Introduction Numerous Iranian intellectuals engaged in theorization to address the central question of “What is to be done?” Malkum-Khan was born in Isfahan and, through his father, a translator at the Russian Embassy, traveled to Paris at the age of ten for education. After completing primary studies, he joined the Polytechnic School, studying engineering while simultaneously exploring political thought, particularly the ideas of French revolutionary thinkers, and was notably influenced by Auguste Comte. Debates persist regarding the impact of his ideas on Iranian society and the history of intellectualism in Iran. Scholars like Fereydun Adamiyat regard him as a unique agent of Iranian enlightenment, whereas others view his discourse as marked by self-referential repetition. In general, Malkum-Khan’s role in Iranian intellectual history and enlightenment is so prominent that few Qajar-era texts on law and governance fail to reference him. Drawing upon the ideas of John Stuart Mill, Voltaire, Montesquieu, and Auguste Comte, he sought to establish a bureaucratic, law-based state as a praxis of liberation from despotism and the absence of legal order. He perceived Iran’s disorder as stemming from such deficiencies. Examination of his works reveals that, despite apparent internal contradictions, his overarching discourse consistently aimed to expose Iran’s social and political disarray. In Malkum-Khan’s view, the solution to societal decay lay in the establishment of rule of law.   Methodology This study adopts a qualitative, descriptive-analytical approach, emphasizing political thought to address the fundamental question: “What is to be done?” The methodology involves a fourfold interpretive cycle. First, political thought responds to social challenges or crises, whether economic, ethical, or otherwise. Second, political thought has an epistemic dimension, focusing on understanding reality and human nature as constitutive of political reasoning. Third, it carries a normative implication, envisioning an ideal or improved state of affairs in response to existing conditions. Fourth, political thought has a practical dimension, translating ideas into actionable solutions for identified social and political challenges. This framework enables an integrated understanding of Malkum-Khan’s thought and praxis. Discussion and Analysis From the latter half of the Naserian era to the preparatory stages of the Constitutional Movement, Iranian reformist intellectuals introduced new political perspectives, gradually rendering traditional political treatises obsolete. Intellectuals, including Malkum-Khan, diagnosed the country’s disorder, attributing it to multiple factors, among them deficiencies in language and education. He identified the roots of Iran’s disorder in religious conservatism, political inefficiency, unfamiliarity with modern sciences, and the absence of legal order. His solutions spanned political, economic, cultural, and educational domains. Malkum-Khan’s thought followed a coherent trajectory across social, political, and cultural spheres. It was philosophical in nature, emerging from the reality of the Iranian condition and aiming to substantiate scientific rationality. His systematic approach rendered his diagnosis and solutions both practical and theoretical, reflecting a transformative and liberating praxis. In his Daftar-e Tanzimat, addressed to the Grand Vizier, he proposed comprehensive legal and administrative reforms to regulate various spheres of society and state. He advocated political reforms from above, describing Iran as uniquely poised to adopt any regulatory framework without obstruction. His theoretical commitment to a constitutional liberal system was complemented by practical efforts to guide the Qajar monarchs and the traditional society toward reform, particularly through his newspaper, Qanun. Malkom-Khan emphasized law as the foundation for securing citizens’ rights, expanding freedoms, and promoting dynamic governance—ultimately enabling societal liberation and modernization. The Ketabcheh-ye Ghaibi and Resaleh-ye Tanzimat, written circa 1238–1239 SH / 1859–1860 CE, sought to persuade Naser al-Din Shah to implement political reforms, emphasizing the role of law as the phoenix enabling Iran’s rise from backwardness. His approach to law and governance, though interpretable within institutionalist frameworks, harmonized Islamic tradition and Western rationality, distinguishing his thought from purely Western technical approaches. Conclusion Mirza Malkum-Khan emerges as an intellectual who revealed new dimensions of awareness in politics, economics, and science, striving to reconcile traditional reason with modern scientific rationality. His work demonstrates educational and intellectual praxis rooted in normative, legal, and institutional concerns. His political thought combines positivist, science-based approaches with attention to Islamic and Iranian nationalist values. His theory of legal governance and liberatory praxis addresses both practical political concerns and theoretical reasoning. The intellectual elements in his works, while reflecting attention to multiple spheres of praxis, reveal internal tensions due to epistemic limitations in understanding modern thought. For instance, his focus on subjectivity, progressivism, nationalism, language reform, and rule of law reflects a philosophical ontology bridging modern human-centered epistemology with traditional religious frameworks. In sum, Iran’s decay permeated political, economic, linguistic, and cultural domains, and Malkum-Khan’s proposed solution centered on political-social reforms and regulatory adjustments.   References Adamiyat, F. (2015) The thought of freedom and the prelude to the constitutional movement. Tehran: Sokhan. [In Persian/Farsi] Agha Hosseini, A., & Mahdipur, A. (2013) Deconstruction of the discourse of the first wave of intellectualism in Iran: Mirza Malkom Khan, Akhundzadeh, and Mirza Agha Khan Kermani. Scientific-Research Journal of Political Science, 9(2), 45–58. [In Persian/Farsi] Ajoudani, M. (2023) Iranian constitutionalism. Tehran: Akhtaran. [In Persian/Farsi] Al-Daoud, S. A. (2018) The first attempts at legislation in Iran. Tehran: Sokhan. [In Persian/Farsi] Algar, H. (1973) Mirza Malkum Khan: A study in the history of Iranian modernism. Berkeley: University of California Press. Ames, R. (2021) The many faces of Iranian modernity: Sufism and subjectivity in the Safavid and Qajar periods. Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press. Ansari, A. (2003) Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and after. London: Longman. Asil, H. (2017) The treatises of Mirza Malkom Khan Nazem al-Dawlah. Tehran: Nia. [In Persian/Farsi] Bhaskar, R. (2008) Dialectic: The pulse of freedom. London: Routledge. Bhaskar, R. (2014) The possibility of naturalism: A philosophical critique of the contemporary human sciences. London: Routledge. Dilami-Ma'zi, A. (2012) The failure of constitutionalism in Iran. Tehran: Islamic Azad University Press. [In Persian/Farsi] Dilami-Ma'zi, A., et al. (2017) The West and modernity from the perspective of Mirza Malkom Khan. Scientific-Research Quarterly of History Studies, 12(46), 127–140. [In Persian/Farsi] Emringer, M. (2023) The book of education, religion, and the discourse of cultural reform (M. Haqiqatkhah, Trans.). Tehran: Qoqnoos. [In Persian/Farsi] Haghdar, A. A. (2017). The letters of Mirza Malkom Khan Nazem al-Dawlah (Selected letters and texts). Tehran: Cheshmeh. [In Persian/Farsi] Hashemi, J. (2005) The growth and decline of Iranians: The reasons for Iranian backwardness and a diagnosis of Iranian society. Tehran: Enteshar. [In Persian/Farsi] Jalili, M., & Jamalzadeh, N. (2022) A comparative re-reading of Iranian intellectuals’ encounter with Western modernity (Focusing on the views of Seyed Jamaluddin Asadabadi and Mirza Malkom Khan Nazem al-Dawlah). Islamic Political Studies, 10(21), 266–291. [In Persian/Farsi] Kasravi, A. (2022) The history of the Iranian constitutional revolution. Tehran: Negah. [In Persian/Farsi] Malkom Khan, M. N. al-D. (2024) The Tanzimat book: The Ghiyabi book and other treatises. Tehran: Omid Farda Publications. [In Persian/Farsi] Masoudi, A. (2021) Iranian constitutionalism and the question of law. Tehran: Scientific-Cultural Publishing. [In Persian/Farsi] Mazinani, M. S. (2011) The distinctions between religious and westernized constitutionalists. Qom: Bostan-e-Ketab Institute. [In Persian/Farsi] Mordakhani, F. (2022) The concept of law in the thought of Mirza Malkom Khan. Quarterly Journal of Islamic-Iranian Political Studies, 1(1), 137–166. [In Persian/Farsi] Monouheri, A., & Khatami, F. (2013) The political act and praxis in the political thought of Mirza Abdulrahim Talebof Tabrizi. Quarterly Journal of Political-International Approaches, 5(36), 111–136. [In Persian/Farsi] Najafzadeh, M. (2018) Shifting two revolutions: Religious turns in Iranian society. Tehran: Tisa. [In Persian/Farsi] Nasri, A. (2011) Facing modernity. Tehran: Elm. [In Persian/Farsi] Nategh, H. (1976) The Law newspaper. Tehran: Amir Kabir. [In Persian/Farsi] Qazi Moradi, H. (2021) Malkom Khan (Political modernization theorist at the dawn of constitutionalism). Tehran: Akhtaran. [In Persian/Farsi] Salehi Heikouyi, A., et al. (2018) The concept of the rule of law in the thought of Mirza Malkom Khan Nazem al-Dawlah. Contemporary Political Essays, 9(4), 57–75. [In Persian/Farsi] Sayer, A. (2006) Method in social sciences: A realist approach (E. Afrogh, Trans.). Tehran: Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies. [In Persian/Farsi] Shahriari, A., et al. (2023) The conceptual evolution of limiting power in the political thought of the Qajar era (The process of transition from autocratic monarchy to constitutional monarchy). Quarterly Journal of Political Theory, 18(32), 173–200. [In Persian/Farsi] Tabatabaei, M. T. (2019) Mirza Malkom Khan and the idea of method. Quarterly Journal of Western Studies, 10(2), 142–168. [In Persian/Farsi] Tabatabaei, S. J. (2007) Reflections on Iran (Vol. 2, Part 2). Tehran: Minouye Khord. [In Persian/Farsi] Taheri-Moghadam, S. M., & Bochani, E. (2015) Mirza Malkom Khan Nazem al-Dawlah and reflections on his educational ideas. Historical Essays, 6(1), 73–88. [In Persian/Farsi] Vahdat, F. (2017) Intellectual confrontation of Iran with modernity (M. Haqiqatkhah, Trans.). Tehran: Qoqnoos. [In Persian/Farsi]     <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Mashhad, Iran. athari@um.ac.ir <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> Corresponding Author: Ph.D Student in Political Science (Iranian Issues Orientation), Ferdowsi University of Mashhad, Iran. eh.mozdkhah@mail.um.ac.ir«میرزا ملکُمخان ناظمالدوله» (1212-1287) از جمله مهم&zwnj;ترین متفکران عصر مشروطیت ایرانی است. اندیشه سیاسی وی اساساً در چارچوب تاریخنگاری اندیشه معاصر ایرانی تببین و تفسیر شده است. بررسی آرا و افکار وی نشان می&zwnj;دهد که ملکمخان در جستوجو برای رهایی ایران از استبداد، تحجر و عقب&zwnj;ماندگی بوده است. در این پژوهش، آرا و اندیشههای ملکمخان با تأکید بر رهیافت دلالتگونه و با استفاده از روش مفهومی رئالیسم انتقادی بررسی خواهد شد. این چنین کنشی، کوششی برای نوع شناخت از امر واقع و در پاسخ به پرسش تاریخی دویستساله ایران یعنی «چه باید کرد؟» -که توسط هر اندیشمندی از جمله ملکمخان صورت میگیرد- بیان شده که این امر توانایی شناخت بیشتر تفکر سیاسی- اجتماعی در ایران معاصر را دارد. در این چارچوب، پاسخ ملکمخان به پرسش بنیادین «چه باید کرد؟» در حوزههای گوناگون سیاست، اقتصاد و فرهنگ بررسی شده و با توجه به این مسئله، از رئالیسم انتقادی برای تببین و تفسیر اندیشه سیاسی میرزا ملکمخان استفاده شده است. خروجی و نتیجه این نوشتار، ابعاد جدیدی از اندیشه سیاسی ملکمخان را روشن میسازد و نوعی از ایدۀ حکومتمندی در آرای این متفکر قابل &zwnj;فهم است.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/45057

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922The Distinction between Politics and the Political in the Thought of Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffeتمایز سیاست و امر سیاسی در اندیشه «کارل اشمیت» و «شانتال موف»7195fa خیراله اکبریدانشجوی دکتری علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 0009000951863715علی اشرفنظریدانشیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران202554The Distinction between Politics and the Political in the Thought of Carl Schmitt and Chantal Mouffe   Kheirollah Akbari<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Ali Ashraf Nazari<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a>   The central question of this article is: “From the perspective of Chantal Mouffe and Carl Schmitt, what are the points of similarity and divergence regarding the political?” The main hypothesis suggests that while Mouffe borrows the concept of the political from Schmitt, she distances herself considerably from Schmitt’s sovereign-centered model of antagonism. She contends that only through the acknowledgment of antagonism at the heart of the political can the possibility of democratic politics be realized. Mouffe’s agonistic democracy thus represents an inversion of Carl Schmitt’s conception of the political.   Keywords: Politics, The Political, Schmitt, Mouffe, Antagonism.   Introduction Every interpretation of the political contains within it a distinct prescription regarding the nature of the state. Exploring this claim through the lens of Carl Schmitt’s adversarial conception of the political and Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic reworking, which frames politics as rooted in power, conflict, and enmity, constitutes a significant inquiry. Schmitt grounds the political in a permanent sphere of hostility, insisting that any definition of the political requires a distinct classification. At the same time, although many separate studies have examined Schmitt and Mouffe individually, there has been no sustained comparative assessment of their approaches to differentiating politics from the political—hence the significance and necessity of this study. For Schmitt, antagonism is the constitutive element of the political, and war functions as an ever-present possibility that fundamentally shapes political behavior. From this premise, he criticizes the liberalism of his era. Schmitt grounds social existence in religion and defines the political in relation to politics. His analysis highlights the inextricable link between politics and war, where the sovereign’s decision to wage war—killing or being killed—constitutes the highest expression of political action. In his formulation, the political rests upon the friend/enemy distinction as its most radical principle. Mouffe, by contrast, views politics as an arena of contestation among antagonistic human beings situated in a contingent world, structured through linguistic practices and social struggles. Advocating pluralism, she seeks to open the political to a diversity of groups. Politics, for her, is the domain of co-existence among conflicting values mediated through discursive hegemony; its purpose is not to eradicate antagonism but to transform it into a manageable form. Against dominant deliberative and consensual models, Mouffe articulates an agonistic conception of democracy, distinguishing agonism from pure antagonism. The central argument of this article is that while Mouffe, influenced by Schmitt, regards the political as irreducibly conflictual, she redefines it through the concept of agonism, distancing herself from Schmitt’s model of sovereign-centered antagonism.   Literature Review Mouffe (1403 SH / 2024 CE), in her work The Axis of the Green Democratic Revolution: Left Populism and the Power of Affects, critiques rationalist currents within the left and modernist notions of progress, emphasizing the role of emotions and subjective experience in crafting successful political strategies. Schmitt (1390 SH / 2011 CE), in Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, stresses that politics consists in the sovereign decision and the differentiation between “us” and “them,” culminating in the friend/enemy distinction. For him, this dichotomy is so decisive that it supersedes religious, economic, or cultural criteria.   Methodology This research employs an analytical–critical (theory critique) and comparative approach, relying primarily on library-based sources.   Theoretical Framework: Arendt’s Pluralism vs. Schmitt’s Distinction Hannah Arendt conceptualizes the political as the sphere of consensus-building. For her, politics concerns the peaceful co-existence of diverse human beings. By contrast, Schmitt defines the political in terms of distinction, not acceptance of difference: its essence lies in the friend/enemy divide. On this basis, Mouffe’s political thought can be understood through Arendt’s pluralist stance: opening space for the other within politics through dialogue, cooperation, and rivalry. This contrasts with Schmitt’s insistence on the centrality of the friend/enemy distinction as a quasi-transcendental condition defining the subject of the political. Similarities and Differences in Schmitt’s and Mouffe’s Conceptions of the Political Schmitt’s analysis provides the point of departure for Mouffe’s argument and underpins her insistence on pluralistic agonism. Schmitt’s critiques of liberal democracy opened conceptual space for Mouffe’s project of radical democracy. She adopts his concept of “neutralization” to argue that liberal democracies, in the aftermath of the Cold War, have universalized a hegemonic interpretation of democratic values while excluding any external “other.” Points of similarity include: their shared recognition of conflict as constitutive of the political and the acceptance of antagonism as irreducible. Points of divergence include: Schmitt’s insistence on an unresolvable antagonism versus Mouffe’s transformable agonism; Mouffe’s rejection of Schmitt’s sovereign-centered logic of conflict; and her inversion of Schmitt’s formulation of the political through pluralism and agonistic democracy. Critical Reading of Schmitt and Mouffe Critiques of Schmitt include: <ul> <li>Ambiguity and over-simplification in defining the political</li> <li>A one-sided conception of the enemy</li> <li>Theorization of political violence</li> </ul> Critiques of Mouffe include: <ul> <li>Distance from Enlightenment rationalism and conventional sociological approaches</li> <li>Rejection of traditional socialist interpretations</li> <li>Reliance on minimal consensus and dialogue even amid antagonism</li> </ul>   Conclusion Mouffe advances the necessity of theorizing the political by reinterpreting Schmitt’s concepts of antagonism and decision. For her, the political pertains to conflict and contestation, and thus to decision, not free deliberation. She borrows from Schmitt two central ideas—antagonism and decision-making—while reframing them in her critique of liberal democracy. Schmitt’s friend/enemy distinction forms the theoretical backbone of Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism. Yet, Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism suffers from a fundamental shortcoming: the assumption that agonism can be domesticated into stable democratic practice. Her model remains vulnerable to the problem that reconciliation within agonism may not, in practice, be possible or sustainable.   Refrencecs Arendt, H. (1998) The human condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ārent, H. (2015) Siyāsat chīst? (N. Fatturchi & S. Najafi, Trans.; M. Farhadpour et al., Eds.). Tehran: Bidgol. [In Persian/Farsi] Bāqerī Qal‘eh-Sarī, A. (2022) Tamāyuz-e siyāsat va amr-e siyāsī dar falsafe-ye siyāsī-ye noṣadrā’īyān. Faslnāmeh-ye Andīshe-ye Siyāsī dar Eslām, 34 (Winter), 55–77. [In Persian/Farsi]. Barrett, M. (1991) Ideology, politics, hegemony: From Gramsci to Laclau and Mouffe. Michigan Quarterly Review, 30, 231–258. Crowder, G. (2006, September 25–27) Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic democracy. Paper presented at the Australasian Political Studies Association conference, University of Newcastle. Erman, E. (2009) What is wrong with agonistic pluralism? Reflections on conflict in democratic theory. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 35(9), 1039–1062. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453709343385 Ḥamīdī, S. (1394/2015) Revāyat-e te’olojīkal az amr-e siyāsī dar andīshe-ye Kārl Eshmīt. Pazhūhesh-e Siyāsat-e Naz̤arī, 18(Fall & Winter), 25–48. [In Persian/Farsi] Jīžek, S. (Žižek, S.) (2019) Rāhnamā-ye sargashtagān (M. Z. Zamānī, Trans.). Tehran: ‘Elmi va Farhangī. [In Persian/Farsi] Malekzādeh, Ḥ. (2014) Shāntāl Mūf va vārunagī-ye amr-e siyāsī. Faslnāmeh-ye Pazhūheshhā-ye Siyāsī, 11(Winter), 131–151. [In Persian/Farsi] Mouffe, C. (1999) Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism? Social Research, 66(3), 745–758. Mouffe, C. (2000) Deliberative democracy or agonistic pluralism. Vienna: Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS). Mouffe, C. (2005) On the political. New York: Routledge. Mouffe, Ch. (2012) Dar bāra-ye amr-e siyāsī (M. Anṣārī, Trans.). Tehran: Rokhdād-e Now. [In Persian/Farsi] Mouffe, Ch. (2014) ‘Arṣa-ye āgūnīsm* (A. ‘Abbās Beigī, Trans.). Retrieved April 11, 2014, from <a href="http://thesis11.com/Print.aspx?Id=135">http://thesis11.com/Print.aspx?Id=135</a> [In Persian/Farsi] Mouffe, Ch. (2024) Enqelāb-e demokrātīk-e sabz: Pūpūlīsm-e chap va qudrat-e ‘avātef (E. Āqāyī, Trans.; 2nd ed.). Tehran: Ketābsarā-ye Mīrda&scaron;tī. [In Persian/Farsi] Naẓarī, ‘A. A. (2015) Bāzḵẖwānī-ye enteqādī-ye mafhūm-e amr-e siyāsī dar naẓarīye-ye Kārl Eshmīt. Faslnāmeh-ye Siyāsat, 45(4, Winter), 991–1014. [In Persian/Farsi] Naẓarī, ‘A. A. (2017) Charkhesh-e mafhūm-e siyāsat va bāzāfarīnī-ye amr-e siyāsī: Dark-e zaminehā-ye hastī-shenākhtī. Faslnāmeh-ye Siyāsat, 41(Spring), 257–277. [In Persian/Farsi] Nīrumand Ālānkesh, M., & Morteẓavī, K. (2021) Amr-e siyāsī az naẓar-e Shāntāl Mūf dar fahm va tabyīn-e jonbesh-e Jalīqe Zardhā. Jostārhā-ye Siyāsī-ye Mo‘āṣer, 12(1/39, Spring), 157–181. [In Persian/Farsi] ‘Ābedī Ardaḳānī, M., & Allāhdādī, N. (2018) Kārl Eshmīt va te’orizah kardan-e khoshūnat. Do Faslnāmeh-ye ‘Elmī–Pazhūheshī-ye Gharbshenāsī-ye Bonyādī, 9 (1, Spring–Summer), 115–139. [In Persian/Farsi]. Omīd‘Alī, B., et al. (2024) Bardāsht-e Rālz az amr-e siyāsī. Pazhūhesh-e Siyāsat-e Naz̤arī, 36 (Fall–Winter), 1–28. [In Persian/Farsi] Owrbak, M. (Orbak, M.) (2014) Kārl Eshmīt dar jost-o-jū-ye amr-e siyāsī: Elāhiyyāt, taṣmīm-gīrī va mafhūm-e doshman. In Kārl Eshmīt, Mafhūm-e amr-e siyāsī (Y. Jīrānī & R. Namāzī, Trans.). Tehran: Qoqnūs. [In Persian/Farsi] Pozūkī, G. (2011) Sūyehā-ye siyāsī-ye khod va degarī dar adabīyāt-e dāstānī-ye dahe-ye chehel-e Jalāl Āl-e Ahmad (Master’s thesis). Tarbiat Modares University, Faculty of Humanities. [In Persian/Farsi] Roskamm, N. (2015) On the other side of agonism: The enemy, the outside, and the role of antagonism. Planning Theory, 14(4), 384–403. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095214533959">https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095214533959</a> Schmitt, C. (2011) Elāhiyyāt-e siyāsī (L. Chamanxwāh, Trans.; Vol. 1). Tehran: Negāh-e Mo‘āṣer. [In Persian/Farsi] Schmitt, C. (2014a) Elāhiyyāt-e siyāsī: Chahār faṣl darbāre-ye ḥākemīyat (L. Chamanxwāh, Trans.). Tehran: Negāh-e Mo‘āṣer. [In Persian/Farsi] Schmitt, C. (2014b) Mafhūm-e amr-e siyāsī (Y. Jīrānī & R. Namāzī, Trans.). Tehran: Qoqnūs. [In Persian/Farsi] Strauss, L. (2013) Yāddāsht-hā dar bāb-e Kārl Eshmīt, mafhūm-e amr-e siyāsī. In Kārl Eshmīt, Mafhūm-e amr-e siyāsī (Y. Jīrānī & R. Namāzī, Trans.). Tehran: Qoqnūs. [In Persian/Farsi] Tājīk, M. R. (2013) Pāsāmārksīsm va pāsāmārksīsm. Tehran: ‘Elm. [In Persian/Farsi]     <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Corresponding Author: Ph.D Student in Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. <a href="mailto:kheirolah.akbari@ut.ac.ir">kheirolah.akbari@ut.ac.ir</a> <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. aashraf@ut.ac.irپرسش اساسی مقاله این است که «امر سیاسی از چشمانداز شانتال موف و کارل اشمیت از چه وجوه همسان و ناهمسانی برخوردار است؟» در پاسخ، فرضیۀ اصلی این است که موف&zwnj; در عین عاریه گرفتن مفهوم امر سیاسی از اشمیت، فاصلۀ بيشتري&zwnj; از&zwnj; مدل&zwnj; اشميتي&zwnj; آنتاگونيسم با محوریت حکمران&zwnj; گرفته و معتقد است که تنها با قبول جنبۀ آنتاگونيسم امر سياسي ميتوان امکان تحقق سياست دموکراتيک را فراهم نمود. دموکراسي آگونيستي موف، شکل وارونۀ آن چيزي است که کارل اشميت از پنداره امر سـياسي ارائه کرده است.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/50137

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922Conceptualizing the “Bound Subject” and Its Representation Among Religious Intellectualsمفهوم‌سازی «سوژۀ مقیّد» و بازنمود آن در میان روشن‌فکران دینی97131faمجیدسرونددانش‌آموخته دکتری، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران2025125Conceptualizing the “Bound Subject” and Its Representation Among Religious Intellectuals   Majid Sarvand<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a>   In the West, the subject has shifted from a wholly free, conscious, independent, and self-grounded entity to a position constrained by the unconscious, the other, history, tradition, structure, discourse, and power—ultimately leading to a dialectical description of it. The central question of this study is: What position has the subject occupied within the current of religious intellectualism in Iran after the Islamic Revolution? The research hypothesis is that within Iranian religious intellectualism, attention and emphasis have been placed on human subjectivity—specifically individual subjectivity—and that a new, human-centered interpretation of religion is offered which, in harmony with the requirements of modern civilization, emphasizes human centrality, will, freedom, the right to choose, flourishing, individuality, and subjectivity. This article seeks to, first, present a historical review of the transformations in the understanding and interpretation of the concept of "subjectivity" in the modern era, and then examine the approach of religious intellectualism to it, with particular focus on the thought and works of Mehdi Bazargan. Furthermore, using a descriptive-analytical method and based on documentary and library sources, the collected material will be analyzed.   Keywords: Constrained subject, Critical Theory, Bazargan, Shabestari, Soroush.   Introduction The concept of the "subject" in the history of political and philosophical thought in the West has undergone profound and foundational transformations. If, at the dawn of modernity, the subject was recognized as a "knowing agent," a free, self-grounded, and independent being in Cartesian philosophy and Enlightenment rationality, it did not take long before various intellectual currents challenged this absolutist and individualistic conception. Marxism, Freudian psychoanalysis, structuralist linguistics, post-structuralist schools, and the critiques of the Frankfurt School each, in their own way, emphasized the limitations of the subject and its entanglement with social, historical, discursive, and power structures. Within this framework, the "free subject" became the "constrained subject"—an agent who, though possessing freedom, will, and individuality, is always in tension with history, structures, power, and the other. On the other hand, in post-revolutionary Iran, the current of religious intellectualism has been one of the most important arenas in which the concept of the subject and individuality has been rethought through a religious, human-centered interpretation. Thinkers such as Mehdi Bazargan, Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari, and Abdolkarim Soroush have sought, in response to the exigencies of the modern world and intellectual transformations, to reread the relationship between religion, human beings, and freedom. From this perspective, the essential question is: What place does the subject occupy in religious intellectualism, and how can it be conceptualized within the framework of the "constrained subject"?   Significance of the Research The importance of addressing this topic can be explained from several perspectives: <ol> <li>Theoretical necessity: In modern political thought and philosophy, the subject has always been central to epistemic and social reflections and transformations. Understanding the relationship between human beings and freedom, agency, morality, and society is impossible without analyzing the subject.</li> <li>Historical necessity: In the context of post-revolutionary Iran, religious intellectualism has attempted to establish a new relationship between religious tradition and the requirements of modernity. These efforts cannot be understood without attention to the question of the subject and individuality.</li> <li>Practical-political necessity: Re-examining the concept of the subject in the thought of religious intellectuals can contribute to a better understanding of the theoretical foundations of democracy, citizenship rights, and popular sovereignty in contemporary Iran.</li> <li>Discursive necessity: In contrast to the official, jurisprudential-ideological reading of religion, religious intellectuals have offered an alternative interpretation that emphasizes individual experience, inner freedom, and conscious choice. Clarifying the concept of the subject can help further delineate the boundaries of this discourse.</li> </ol>   Research Objective The main goal of this study is to conceptualize the "constrained subject" and explain its representation among Iranian religious intellectuals. More specifically, this research aims to: <ul> <li>Review the historical transformations of the concept of the subject in the West.</li> <li>Analyze the understanding of subjectivity and individuality in the thought of religious intellectuals.</li> <li>Show how these thinkers, while affirming human freedom and individuality, emphasize the subject’s connection with God, morality, and religious experience.</li> <li>Re-examine the political implications of this perspective concerning democracy, individual freedoms, and the relationship between religion and politics.</li> </ul>   Research Questions and Hypothesis The main research question is: What is the position of the subject in Iranian religious intellectualism after the Islamic Revolution, and how can it be conceptualized as a "constrained subject"?   Sub-questions: <ol> <li>How have transformations in Western thought influenced our understanding of the subject?</li> <li>What is the relationship between the modern subject, postmodern critiques, and the constrained subject?</li> <li>How have religious intellectuals (especially Bazargan, Shabestari, and Soroush) redefined the subject in relation to religion and modernity?</li> <li>What are the political and social implications of this perspective for understanding democracy and popular sovereignty in Iran?</li> </ol> The central hypothesis of this research is that in Iranian religious intellectualism, emphasis has been placed on the individual subject, freedom, agency, and human flourishing; at the same time, this subject is constrained by its relationship with God and religious experience. Thus, contrary to the jurisprudential-ideological approach that emphasizes obedience and authority, religious intellectuals have offered a human-centered and liberty-seeking interpretation of religion that is more compatible with modernity and democracy.   Findings <ol> <li>Historical review: In the Western tradition, the subject has traversed a complex path from the Cartesian cogito to the critiques of Husserl, Wittgenstein, Adorno, Horkheimer, and Foucault. This path has taken the subject from being self-grounded to being deeply entangled with power and history.</li> <li>Constrained subject: This study argues that the modern human condition is a dual one; while the subject enjoys freedom and agency, it is always formed in connection with the other, tradition, history, and power. This condition may be termed the "constrained subject."</li> <li>Role of Foucault: In Foucault’s thought, the subject is simultaneously a knowing agent and an object of subjugation. He speaks of the possibility of resistance and the creation of alternative ways of living. This provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the constrained subject.</li> <li>Bazargan: In Mehdi Bazargan’s thought, the human being possesses innate dignity and inner freedom. He emphasizes individuality, agency, and personal initiative, yet ultimately holds that this freedom must be employed in the pursuit of divine elevation and spiritual perfection. Hence, he can be seen as a prominent representative of the concept of the "subject constrained by God."</li> <li>Shabestari and Soroush: These thinkers, by critiquing the official reading of religion, emphasize individual religious experience and freedom in interpreting religion. From their perspective, religion is not a set of rigid prescriptions but a spiritual experience that transforms the individual into a free subject who is nonetheless bound by ethics and faith.</li> <li>Political implications: According to this approach, democracy is the best environment for the flourishing of the subject and the realization of individuality. Popular sovereignty, individual freedoms, and citizenship rights are all grounded in the intrinsic value and dignity of the human being. In contrast, authoritarian or jurisprudential-ideological systems suppress individuality by subjugating the subject.</li> </ol>   Conclusion This study demonstrates that the concept of the "constrained subject" can serve as a key to understanding both the freedom and limitations of human beings in the modern world. Iranian religious intellectuals, inspired by the foundations of modernity and while remaining faithful to the religious tradition, have sought to offer a new interpretation of religion in which the human being is both free and autonomous, yet finds meaning through connection with God and religious experience. Thus, the "constrained subject" is neither a passive agent crushed by power nor the absolute Cartesian subject, but a human being who continually creates and recreates themselves in the field of tension between freedom and necessity, history and faith, individuality and community. This concept can provide a theoretical foundation for rethinking the relationship between religion, politics, and democracy in contemporary Iran.   References Adorno, T., & Horkheimer, M. (2017) Dialectic of Enlightenment (M. Farhadpour & O. Mehregan, Trans., 2nd ed.). Hermes. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1948) The infinitely smalls. In Collected Works, Vol. 14: Scientific, social, and Islamic discussions. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1955) Review of Erich Fromm’s theory. In Collected Works, Vol. 10: Comparative discussions and scientific critiques. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1956) The prophetic mission and evolution. In Collected Works, Vol. 2: Prophethood 1. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1958) The social and global Muslim. In Collected Works, Vol. 2: Prophethood 1. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1959) Man and God. In Collected Works, Vol. 2: Prophethood 1. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1961) Spontaneity. In Collected Works, Vol. 2: Prophethood 1. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1965) The endless particle. In Collected Works, Vol. 1: Fundamental discussions. Ghalam. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1967) The prophetic mission and Abraham. In Collected Works, Vol. 17: Prophethood 2. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1968) The kingdom of God. In Collected Works, Vol. 17: Prophethood 2. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1972) The afterlife and God as the goal of prophetic missions. In Collected Works, Vol. 17: Prophethood 2. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1979) Return to the Qur’an 2: Anthropology and human perspective in the Qur’an. In Collected Works, Vol. 19. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1984) The Iranian Revolution in Two Movements (4th ed.). Mazaheri Press. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1956) Definition of government from below. In Collected Works, Vol. 22: The Islamic Revolution of Iran. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1955) The path taken. In Collected Works, Vol. 1: Fundamental discussions. Ghalam. [In Persian/Farsi] Bazargan, M. (1948) The source of independence. In Collected Works, Vol. 14: Scientific, social, and Islamic discussions. Bazargan Cultural Foundation. [In Persian/Farsi] Descartes, R. (1993) Discourse on method. In The history of philosophy in Europe (M. A. Foroughi, Trans.). Zavar. [In Persian/Farsi] Foucault, M. (2010) Subject and power. In Theater of philosophy (N. Sarkhosh & A. Jahandideh, Trans.). Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Kant, I., et al. (1997) What is Enlightenment? Theories and definitions (S. Aryanpour, Trans.). Agah. [In Persian/Farsi] Lawrence, B. (2009) Michel Foucault. In Great Sociological Thinkers by Rob Stones (M. Mirdamadi, Trans.). Markaz. [In Persian/Farsi] Matick, P. (1965) Humanism and socialism (V. Taghavi, Trans.). http://www.kavoshgar.org Miller, P. (2005) Subject, domination, and power (N. Sarkhosh & A. Jahandideh, Trans., 2nd ed.). Nashr-e Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Mojtahed Shabestari, M. (2000a) Faith, politics, and government. In Faith and freedom. Tarh-e No. [In Persian/Farsi] Mojtahed Shabestari, M. (2000b) Faith and freedom (3rd ed.). Tarh-e No. [In Persian/Farsi] Mojtahed Shabestari, M. (2004a) Freedom and ethics. In Reflections on interpretation. <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0-yjlhQeOc">https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e0-yjlhQeOc</a> Nazari, A. (2012) Subject, power, and politics: From Machiavelli to post-Foucault. Ashian. [In Persian/Farsi] Sabir, Z., & Shahabi, P. (2012) The relationship between subject and power in Don Quixote and Madame Bovary based on Michel Foucault’s views. Political Theory Research, 11(Spring & Summer), 181–200. [In Persian/Farsi] Sluga, H. (1983) Subjectivity in the Tractatus (M. Sadeghi & E. Karamati, Trans.). http://tarjomaan.com/archives:5456 Spiegelberg, H. (2013) The phenomenological movement: A historical introduction (M. Aliya, Trans., Vols. 1–2, 2nd ed.). Minouye Kherad. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (1991) Islam and development– Infidelity and underdevelopment. In Heavier than ideology (8th ed.). Serat Cultural Institute. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (1996a) Interpretation of the sacred text. In Expansion of the prophetic experience (5th ed.). Serat Cultural Institute. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (1996b) Straight paths. Kiyan, 36, 2–16. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (1997a) Freedom as method. In Ethics of the Gods (4th ed.). Tarh-e No. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (1997b) Disturbed mentality, disturbed identity. In Ethics of the gods (4th ed.). Tarh-e No. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (2003a) Freedom and political power. In The etiquette of power, the etiquette of justice. Serat Cultural Institute. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (2003b) Religion and political power. In The etiquette of power, the etiquette of justice. Serat Cultural Institute. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (2008) Wisdom and livelihood (6th ed.). Serat Cultural Institute. [In Persian/Farsi] Soroush, A. (2009) Attributes of the pious (10th ed.). Serat Cultural Institute. [In Persian/Farsi] Vahdat, F. (2004) Iran’s intellectual encounter with modernity (M. Haghighatkhah, Trans.). Qoqnoos. [In Persian/Farsi] Woodruff Smith, D. (2015) Husserl (S. M. T. Shakeri, Trans.). Hikmat. [In Persian/Farsi]     <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Ph.D Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. majid.sarvand@gmail.comسوژه در غرب، از شأنیتی یکسره آزاد و آگاه و مستقل و خودبنیاد به موقعیتی وابسته به ناخودآگاه، دیگری،&zwnj; تاریخ، سنت، ساختار، گفتمان و قدرت محدود شده و در نهایت توصیفی دیالکتیکی از آن مطرح می&zwnj;گردد. در این پژوهش، پرسش اصلی این است که در جریان روشنفکری دینی در ایران -پس از انقلاب اسلامی- سوژه، چه جایگاهی داشته است؟ فرضیۀ پژوهش این خواهد بود که در جریان روشنفکری دینی در ایران به سوژگی آدمی -آن هم سوژۀ فردی- توجّه و تأکید شده و قرائتی جدید -انسانی- از دین عرضه می&zwnj;شود که در سازگاری با اقتضائاتِ تمدن مدرن، بر محوریّتِ انسان، اراده، آزادی، حقّ انتخاب، شکوفایی، فردیّت و سوژگی است. در این مقاله برآنیم تا ضمن ارائۀ مروری تاریخی از دگرگونی&zwnj;ها در درک و برداشت از مفهوم «سوژگی» در دوران مدرن، رویکردِ روشنفکری دینی بدان، به&zwnj;ویژه در آرا و آثار مهدی بازرگان را مورد مداقه قرار دهیم. همچنین با روش توصیفی- تحلیلی و بر پایة منابع اسنادی و کتابخانه&zwnj;ای به تجزیه و تحلیل مطالب گرد&zwnj;آوری&zwnj;شده خواهیم پرداخت.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/49310

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922A Critique of the Idea of Autonomy in Steven Wall`s Liberal Perfectionismنقد ایدۀ خودفرمانی در کمال‌گرایی لیبرال «استیون وال»133165faافشینخاکبازدانشجوی دکتری اندیشه سیاسی دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، ایرانسید علیرضاحسینی بهشتیاستادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، ایرانسيدعليمحمودياستاد دانشکده روابط بین‌الملل وزارت امور خارجه، ‌ایران2024528A Critique of the Idea of Autonomy in Steven Wall`s Liberal Perfectionism Afshin Khakbaz<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Seyyed Alireza Hosseini Beheshti<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a> Seyyed Ali Mahmoudi<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">***</a>   In recent years, the efforts of perfectionist thinkers to respond to the criticisms of neutrality advocates have brought perfectionist governance back into the spotlight of political science discourse. The main criticism from neutrality advocates is the incompatibility of perfectionism with the foundations of liberalism—namely, autonomy and individual freedoms. Consequently, much of the neo-perfectionist literature is devoted to proving the compatibility between perfectionism and liberalism. Among these thinkers is Steven Wall, who has published numerous articles and books on perfectionism and seeks a middle path between full neutrality and full perfectionism. By proposing the idea of liberal perfectionism, Wall attempts to show that perfectionism is not only compatible with autonomy but that autonomy is one of its core elements, and that perfectionism defends freedom rather than obstructs it. This article, using a descriptive-analytical method, critically examines the concept of autonomy and its place in Steven Wall’s liberal perfectionism, aiming to determine to what extent liberal perfectionism can address concerns about the restriction of autonomy and fundamental freedoms by governments claiming perfectionist ideals.   Keywords: Perfectionism, Anti-perfectionism, Autonomy, Liberal Perfectionism, Steven Wall.   Introduction In recent years, perfectionist thinkers have reignited interest in perfectionism within political science by responding to critiques from neutrality advocates. The central critique is that perfectionism conflicts with liberal principles such as autonomy and individual freedom. Thus, neo-perfectionist writings largely aim to demonstrate compatibility between perfectionism and liberalism. Steven Wall, for example, has published extensively on perfectionism and seeks a middle ground between absolute neutrality and absolute perfectionism. His concept of liberal perfectionism argues that perfectionism does not contradict autonomy; rather, autonomy is a fundamental component of it, and perfectionism supports freedom rather than impedes it. Since a government's stance on autonomy determines the extent to which it respects fundamental rights and freedoms and allows individuals to pursue their own conception of a good life, reconciling autonomy with perfectionism could not only address neutrality advocates’ concerns about bias in perfectionist governments but also block attempts by such governments to justify restricting autonomy under the guise of promoting perfection.   Research Background and Theoretical Framework This article uses a descriptive-analytical approach to critically examine the concept of autonomy and its role in Steven Wall’s liberal perfectionism, aiming to assess how effectively liberal perfectionism can address concerns about governments restricting autonomy and basic freedoms. To this end, it summarizes the views of liberal perfectionist thinkers on autonomy and its boundaries: <ul style="text-align: left;"> <li>Thomas Hurka’s maximizing consequentialist perfectionism</li> <li>William Galston’s pluralist perfectionism, which recognizes a spectrum of virtues rather than a single supreme one</li> <li>George Sher’s perfectionism based on reasonable self-restraint, where perfectionist values should neither dominate nor be marginalized</li> <li>Vinit Haksar’s non-consequentialist perfectionism, which allows tolerance without equal freedoms</li> <li>Joseph Raz’s liberal perfectionism, which argues that governments need not endorse a single conception of the good life but should enable citizens to pursue a wide range of valuable goals and ideals</li> </ul>   Steven Wall’s Limited Perfectionism Steven Wall, compared to classical perfectionists, assigns greater importance to autonomy. His limited perfectionism shares much with Joseph Raz’s liberal perfectionism and rejects full-blown perfectionism. Wall believes perfectionism offers a better account of political morality than anti-perfectionism and that liberal perfectionism has stronger justificatory power than anti-perfectionist liberalism. He questions the necessity of excluding perfectionist considerations from public policy, arguing that concerns such as political stability, respect for autonomy, and equal regard for individuals do not invalidate perfectionist policies. Contrary to anti-perfectionist claims, Wall sees personal autonomy as central to human flourishing in liberal perfectionism. He maintains that while governments need not promote every aspect of the good life, ideals like political stability, respect for autonomy, and equal concern for citizens do not undermine the legitimacy of perfectionist policies and should not be excluded from politics.   Perfectionism and Politics Wall argues that perfectionism is compatible with limited government and democracy and is not inherently elitist. He believes perfectionists accept value pluralism and the existence of reasonable but conflicting views about the good life, while rejecting value nihilism. They are typically neither committed to Plato’s philosopher-king nor to John Stuart Mill’s radical pluralism, but see political institutions as tools for advancing substantive moral goals. Limited vs. Universal Perfectionism Wall introduces the concept of limited governmental neutrality based on value pluralism—the acceptance of diverse and reasonable yet incompatible values instead of a single value system. He presents limited perfectionism as a middle path between absolute neutrality and universal perfectionism. This approach aligns with perfectionists’ goal of promoting the good life while also addressing neutrality advocates’ concern about the incompatibility of perfectionism with autonomy. What distinguishes Wall’s limited perfectionism from universal perfectionism is its acceptance of multiple fully good ways of living and the belief that no single way of life holds a privileged status in all contexts.   Limited Perfectionism and Autonomy Autonomy plays a central role in Wall’s political ethics. He defines autonomous individuals as those who actively and consciously take responsibility for their lives and are not subject to coercion or excessive manipulation. Autonomy is not synonymous with the good life but is one of its essential elements. Wall argues that political authorities should create and maintain social conditions that maximize the possibility for citizens to pursue autonomous lives. Requirements of Autonomy Wall contends that full autonomy is unattainable in real-world conditions and is not a suitable goal for political theory. He identifies several factors that limit autonomy: not everyone possesses the mental resilience and perseverance to choose life plans and honor commitments; not all lifestyles require planning; and autonomy can be constrained by coercion (limiting choices) and manipulation (altering preferences).   Rejection of Autonomy as Absolute Good Wall sees autonomy as a necessary component of the good life but not its sole criterion or an absolute good. Autonomy is a conditional good and loses its value if it serves the development of undesirable traits.   Rejection of Maximizing Autonomy Wall considers full autonomy an ideal and unattainable. He believes autonomy exists in degrees and opposes efforts to maximize it, arguing that focusing on one aspect of autonomy may hinder its development in another. Increasing the number of autonomous individuals and deepening autonomy may sometimes conflict, making the principle of maximizing autonomy problematic. Rejection of the Non-Discrimination Argument Wall also rejects the non-discrimination argument. While acknowledging that government decisions, like market forces, can alter opportunity costs, he argues such actions are necessary to prevent chaos and are only objectionable if they favor certain lifestyles over others. He asserts that governments must not only create legal frameworks to facilitate autonomous growth but also actively promote autonomy, which requires supporting certain lifestyles over others. Perfectionism involves both promoting good and preventing bad, so such discrimination does not conflict with autonomy.   Evaluation of Wall’s Views Wall implicitly undermines the intrinsic value of autonomy by deeming it worthless without connection to other elements of the good life, thereby opening the door to government restrictions on autonomy. Limiting autonomy’s value to cases that promote desirable personal development—without specifying who determines desirability—has similar implications. Moreover, Wall does not define the limits of coercion and force in government actions, leaving room for abuse and encroachment on personal autonomy. He also seems to hold stereotypical views of non-Western societies, restricting the value of autonomy to Western contexts and overlooking the fact that silence or lack of protest in non-Western societies often stems from fear of repression, not genuine consent. This article also critiques Wall’s rejection of maximizing autonomy and his defense of government manipulation of opportunity costs, offering suggestions to improve his limited perfectionism.   Conclusion Ultimately, the article concludes that although Wall’s theory of liberal perfectionism suffers from major flaws and contradictions, it is a valuable first step in the right direction. By embracing the value of autonomy, Wall attempts to reconcile liberalism and perfectionism. However, by linking autonomy to valuable goals and lifestyles, he introduces a contradiction that undermines this aim and reduces autonomy to a secondary value. Fundamental questions—such as who determines the value of different lifestyles and the permissible extent of government intervention to support specific conceptions of the good life—remain unanswered. Thus, Wall fails to adequately address neutrality advocates’ core concern about unchecked government interference in individuals’ lives under the guise of promoting valuable lifestyles.   References Galston, W. A. (2004) Liberal pluralism: The implications of value pluralism for political theory and practice. Cambridge University Press. Haksar, V. (1979) Equality, liberty and perfectionism. Oxford University Press. Hurka, T. (1996) Perfectionism. Oxford University Press. Macedo, S. (n.d.). Liberal virtues. In S. Wall & G. Klosko (Eds.), Perfectionism and neutrality (pp. xx–xx). Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. (Replace "xx–xx" with actual page numbers if available, and update "n.d." with the year if known.) Raz, J. (1994) Ethics in the public domain: Essays in the morality of law and politics. Clarendon Press. Sher, G. (1997) Beyond neutrality: Perfectionism and politics. Cambridge University Press. Wall, S. (1998) Liberalism, perfectionism, and restraint. Cambridge University Press.   <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Corresponding Author: Ph.D Student in Political Thought, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran. <a href="mailto:afshinkhakbaz2012@gmail.com">afshinkhakbaz2012@gmail.com</a> <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran. <a href="mailto:abeheshti2002@yahoo.com">abeheshti2002@yahoo.com</a> <a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">*** </a>Professor, Faculty of International Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iran. <a href="mailto:mahmoudi3000@gmail.com">mahmoudi3000@gmail.com</a>در سال&zwnj;های اخیر، تلاش&zwnj;های اندیشمندان کمال&zwnj;گرا برای پاسخ به نقدهای حامیان بی&zwnj;طرفی، حکومت کمال&zwnj;گرایی را دوباره در کانون توجه اندیشمندان علوم سیاسی قرار داده است. عمده&zwnj;ترین نقدِ حامیان بی&zwnj;طرفی حکومت، ناسازگاری کمال&zwnj;گرایی با مبانی لیبرالیسم، یعنی خودفرمانی و آزادی&zwnj;&zwnj;های فردی است. بنابراین بخش زیادی از نوشته&zwnj;های نوکمال&zwnj;گرایان معطوف به اثبات سازگاری میان کمال&zwnj;گرایی و لیبرالیسم است. از جمله می&zwnj;توان به «استیون وال» اشاره کرد که مقالات و کتاب&zwnj;های متعددی در زمینه کمال&zwnj;گرایی منتشر کرده و به &zwnj;دنبال یافتن راهی میانه بین بی&zwnj;طرفی تمام&zwnj;عیار و کمال&zwnj;گرایی تمام&zwnj;عیار است. وال با طرح ایدۀ کمال&zwnj;گرایی لیبرال می&zwnj;کوشد تا نشان دهد که نه&zwnj;تنها کمال&zwnj;گرایی در تعارض با خودفرمانی نیست، بلکه خودفرمانی از عناصر اصلی آن است و کمال&zwnj;گرایی، مدافع آزادی است، نه مانعی در برابر آزادی. مقالۀ حاضر با بهره&zwnj;گیری از روش توصیفی- تحلیلی به بررسی انتقادی مفهوم خودفرمانی و جایگاه آن در کمال&zwnj;گرایی لیبرال استیون وال می&zwnj;پردازد و می&zwnj;کوشد تا معلوم سازد که کمال&zwnj;گرایی لیبرال تا چه حد می&zwnj;تواند دغدغۀ تحدید خودفرمانی و آزادی&zwnj;های اساسی به دست حکومت&zwnj;های مدعی کمال&zwnj;گرایی را رفع کند.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/46836

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922“Difference” and “Becoming”: Understanding the “Other’ in International Relations from a Dialectical Critical Realist Perspective«تفاوت» و «شدن»؛ فهم «دیگری» در روابط بین‌الملل از منظر رئالیسم انتقادی دیالکتیکی167204faحسینسلیمیاستاد تمام روابط بین‌الملل دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران 0000-0002-9330-4606 رامز محمودیدانشجوی دکتری روابط بین‌الملل دانشگاه علامه طباطبایی، تهران، ایران 0009-0007-4827-237020241111 “Difference” and “Becoming”: Understanding the “Other’ in International Relations from a Dialectical Critical Realist Perspective   Hossein Salimi<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Ramez Mahmoudi<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a>   This article seeks to answer the question: “How does Dialectical Critical Realism influence the understanding of the ‘‘Other” in international relations?” The central hypothesis of this study is that Dialectical Critical Realism, by acknowledging the multilayered nature of social phenomena and the multiplicity of existents in the sense of non-identity in international relations, regards dialectics as a mechanism of change and becoming, through which a distinct understanding of the Other—as a realist being in international relations—emerges. The perspective of Dialectical Critical Realism can be applied as a liberatory approach within critical paradigm theories to include marginalized and excluded Others.   Keywords: Dialectical Critical Realism, Other, Ontology, Non-identity, Difference and Becoming, International Relations.   Introduction and Objectives International relations constitute a field of interaction among actors with different identities, which raises the issue of the “Other” in international relations. Human relations, at both micro and macro levels, are conceptualized based on the relation between self and Other, and the manner in which this relation is understood determines the nature of international relations. In the process of understanding the Other, we often witness the reduction of being to knowledge within the framework of subject-object identity, resulting in the marginalization and suppression of the Other’s being. The problematic nature of international relations thus originates in this subjectivity and epistemic authority in the perception of the Other. The objective of this article is to apply the philosophy of science inherent in Dialectical Critical Realism as an interdisciplinary approach that mediates between positivism and post-positivism, addressing existing shortcomings in the understanding of international relations and particularly the question of the Other. Dialectical Critical Realism, emphasizing subject-object non-identity, revives the realist being of the Other in the sense of “difference” and conceives it as “becoming,” implying transformation and change.   Methodology Using Quentin Skinner’s methodological approach grounded in the theory of speech acts, this study seeks to answer the question: “How does Dialectical Critical Realism influence the understanding of the ‘‘Other’ in international relations?” The article’s hypothesis is that Dialectical Critical Realism, by recognizing the multilayered nature of social phenomena and the multiplicity of existents in terms of non-identity in international relations, conceives dialectics as a mechanism of change and becoming. Consequently, a distinct understanding of the Other as a realist being in international relations emerges. Dialectical Critical Realism can therefore serve as a liberatory approach within critical paradigm theories to incorporate marginalized Others.   Findings The diversity of social phenomena and collective identities has shaped both the form and nature of interactions among societies and states in international relations. In fact, this diversity and multiplicity of being and phenomena foregrounds the issue of self/Other distinction in international relations. However, the Other is frequently neglected, and its being is dismissed in contrast with the identity of the “self.” In the process of understanding, the Other is reduced to an object for the subject/self, and comprehension replaces the realist being of the Other. As a result, the Other is objectified and subsequently erased. Traditionally, in Western philosophy and particularly within international relations, being is subordinated to epistemology, and this epistemic fallacy results in the neglect of the Other’s existence. The Other’s being, due to subject-object identity aligned with the self/subject’s knowledge, is conceptualized as a subjective matter. This study proposes a new conceptualization of the Other in international relations as a realist being, grounded in ontological difference and a reinterpretation of dialectics, avoiding the reduction of the self/Other relationship to mere conflict and instead recognizing the agency of the Other in transforming structures and excesses produced by subjectivity. The reduction of the Other to an epistemic object, presenting an objectified reality of its being and negating its realist existence, is a primary issue in philosophical and international relations theories. Neglecting the Other’s independent and realist being in terms of difference or non-identity, and failing to understand the dialectical relation between self and Other, represents a critical conceptual gap in international relations theories, often interpreted solely through the lens of perpetual conflict between multiple identities. Insights from Bhaskar’s Dialectical Critical Realism, along with his reinterpretation of Hegelian dialectics, offer a potential pathway to constructively address this gap. According to Bhaskar, international relations are nothing but the relation between ourselves and others, and actors’ understanding of self and Other emerges in a dialectical and “inter-mental” relation between being/non-being or presence/absence, forming a process of being and becoming. The Other possesses an independent ontological identity, and its realist being cannot be reduced to subjectivity or the knowledge of the mind-based subject. Realist being and difference, in the conceptualization of the “Other,” constitute defining features of the socially constructed world. By embracing an ontology of difference as Other-being, one can escape absolutism and place liberation at the center of international relations theory.     Conclusion Mainstream international relations theories, influenced by Western philosophical traditions, reduce the Other’s being to knowledge and overlook its non-identical and plural nature. However, being and knowledge are not fixed; rather, they exist within a dialectic of negation and becoming, constantly reshaped in varying understandings of the Other. Dialectical Critical Realism, by integrating realist ontology, constructivist epistemology, and a re-conceptualized dialectic, offers an innovative approach in the philosophy of science, particularly for social sciences and international relations. Emphasizing plural ontology and transformation, this theory can be interpreted as a philosophy of “difference” and “becoming,” enabling a nuanced understanding of the Other in international relations. Realist ontology and dialectical processes disrupt conventional notions of self/Other relations, reviving Otherness in defining being. Non-identity liberates the Other from epistemic domination, and dialectics, through the process of negation between presence/absence or being/non-being, frees being from stasis. This leads to a differentiated understanding of the Other, emphasizing that no fixed knowledge or essence can be imposed on either being or the Other.   References Archer, Margaret; Bhaskar, Roy; Collier, Andrew; Lawson, Tony; and Norrie, Alan, (Eds) (1998) Critical Realism: Essential Readings. New York: Routledge. Ash, Steve (2022) Explaining Morality: Critical Realism and Moral Questions. New York: Routledge. Bagley, Christopher; Sawyerr, Alice; & Abubaker, Mahmoud (2016) “Dialectical Critical Realism: Grounded Values and Reflexivity in Social Science Research”, Advances in Applied Sociology, Vol.6, No.12, pp.400-419. Bhaskar, Roy (1998) “Dialectical Critical Realism and Ethics”, in Margaret Archer, Roy Bhaskar, Andrew Collier, Tony Lawson, and Alan Norrie, eds., Critical Realism: Essential Readings. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2000) From East to West: Odyssey of a Soul. London: Routledge. --------------- (2008a) Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom. New York: Routledge. Bhaskar, Roy (2008b) A Realist Theory of Science. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2009) Scientific Realism and Human Emancipation. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2010a) “Contexts of Interdisciplinarity: Interdisciplinarity and Climate Change”, in Roy Bhaskar, Cheryl Frank, Karl Georg Høyer, Petter Næss, and Jenneth Parker, eds., Interdisciplinarity and Climate Change: Transforming Knowledge and Practice for Our Global Future. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2010b) Plato etc.: Problems of Philosophy and Their Resolution. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2012a) Philosophy of Meta-Reality: Creativity, Love, and Freedom. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2012b) Reflections on Meta-Reality: Transcendence, Emancipation, and Everyday Life. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2012c) From Science to Emancipation: Alienation and the Actuality of Enlightenment. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2016) Enlightened Common Sense: The Philosophy of Critical Realism. New York: Routledge. Bhaskar, Roy; Danermark, Berth; and Price, Leigh (2018) Interdisciplinarity and Wellbeing: A Critical Realist General Theory of Interdisciplinarity. New York: Routledge. Buitrago, Sybille Reinke de; and Resende, Erica (2019) “The Politics of Otherness: Illustrating the Identity/Alterity Nexus and Othering in IR”, in Jenny Edkins, ed., Handbook of Critical International Relations. New York: Routledge. Brown, Andrew; Slater, Gary; and Spencer, David A. (2002) “Driven to Abstraction? Critical Realism and the Search for the 'Inner Connection' of Social Phenomena”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.26, No.6, pp.773-788. Callinicos, Alex (2008) “Critical Realism and Beyond: Roy Bhaskar’s Dialectic”, in Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis, eds., Critical Companion to Contemporary Marxism (Vol.16). Netherlands: Brill Publishers. Danermark, Berth; Ekström, Mats; Jakobsen, Liselotte; and Karlsson, Jan Ch. (2002) Explaining Society: Critical Realism in the Social Sciences. London: Routledge. Dean, Kathryn (2004) “Laclau and Mouffe and the Discursive Turn: The Gains and the Losses”, in Jonathan Joseph, John Michael Roberts, eds., Realism, Discourse, and Deconstruction. USA and Canada: Routledge. Edkins, Jenny (2019) Handbook of Critical International Relations. New York: Routledge. Fluck, Matthew (2010) “Truth, Values and the Value of Truth in Critical International Relations Theory”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol.39, Issue.2, pp.259-278. Gerrits, Lasse M.; & Verweij, Stefan (2013) “Critical Realism as a Meta-Framework for Understanding the Relationships between Complexity and Qualitative Comparative Analysis”, Journal of Critical Realism, 12(2), pp.166-182. Gorski, Philip S. (2013) “What is Critical Realism? And Why Should You Care?”, Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews, Vol.42, No.5, pp.658-670. Gunnarsson, Lena (2020) “Why We Keep Separating the Inseparable: Dialecticising Intersectionality”, in Michiel van Ingen, Steph Grohmann, and Lena Gunnarsson, eds., Critical Realism, Feminism, and Gender: A Reader. New York: Routledge. Hall, Rodney B. (2001) “Applying the ‘Self/Other’ Nexus in International Relations”, International Studies Review, Vol.3, Issue.1, pp.101-111. Hartwig, Mervyn (2015) “Roy Bhaskar (1944–2014)”, The Economic and Labour Relations Review, Vol.26, Issue.1, pp.162–163. Hesketh, Anthony; and Fleetwood, Steve (2006) “Beyond Measuring the Human Resources Management–Organizational Performance Link: Applying Critical Realist Meta-Theory”, Organization, Vol.13, Issue.5, pp.677-699. Høyer, Karl Georg (2010) “Technological Idealism: The Case of the Thorium Fuel Cycle”, in Roy Bhaskar, Cheryl Frank, Karl Georg Høyer, Petter Næss, and Jenneth Parker, eds., Interdisciplinarity and Climate Change: Transforming Knowledge and Practice for Our Global Future. New York: Routledge. Judd, Donald (2003) Critical Realism and Composition Theory. London: Routledge. Kavalski, Emilian (2018) The Guanxi of Relational International Theory. New York: Routledge. Koopmans, Erica; and Schiller, Catharine (2019) Understanding Causation in Healthcare: An Introduction to Critical Realism, Qualitative Health Research, Vol.32, Issues 8-9, pp.1207-1214. López, José (2003) “Critical Realism: The Difference it Makes, in Theory”, in Justin Cruickshank, ed., Critical Realism: The Difference it Makes. New York: Routledge. Luongo, Ben (2020) “Critical Realism in International Relations”, in Handbook of Critical International Relations. USA and UK: Edward Elgar Publishing. Lupovici, Amir (2013) “Me and the Other in International Relations: An Alternative Pluralist International Relations”, International Studies Perspectives, Vol.14, No.3, pp.235-254. MacLennan, Gary; and Thomas, Peter (2003) “Cultural Studies: Towards a Realist Intervention”, in Justin Cruickshank, ed., Critical Realism: The Difference it Makes. New York: Routledge. Menon, Tarun (2015) “Roy Bhaskar”, Social Scientist, Vol.43, No.1/2, pp.83-86. Nellhaus, Tobin (2010) Theatre, Communication, Critical Realism. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Neumann, Iver (1995) Collective Identity Formation: Self and Other in International Relations. Italy: European University Institute. Nicholson, John D.; Brennan, Ross; and Midgley, Gerald (2014) “Gaining Access to Agency and Structure in Industrial Marketing Theory: A Critical Pluralist Approach”, Marketing Theory, Vol.14, Issue.4, pp.1-22. --------------- (2010) Dialectic and Difference: Dialectical Critical Realism and the Grounds of Justice. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2024) “Dialectical Critical Realism, Complexity and the Psychology of Blame”, Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, pp.1–18. Nordin, Astrid H. M.; and Smith, Graham M. (2019) “Relating Self and Other in Chinese and Western Thought”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol.0, No.0, pp.1–18. Nunez, Iskra (2012) Critical Realist Activity Theory, PhD Thesis, University of London Institute of Education, UK. --------------- (2023) “On Integral Theory: An Exercise in Dialectical Critical Realism”, Journal of Critical Realism, Vol.22, No.3, pp.431–444. Odysseos, Louiza (2007) The Subject of Coexistence: Otherness in International Relations. USA: University of Minnesota Press. Oliver, Alexandra (2014) Critical Realism in Contemporary Art (Doctoral Thesis), Dietrich School of Arts and Science, University of Pittsburgh, USA. Pârvulescu, Radu Andrei (2020) “Roy Bhaskar’s Core Critical Realism and the Philosophy of Nancy Cartwright: Common Ground”, Science Letter, 15 March. Patomaki, Heikki (2002) After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)construction of World Politics. New York: Routledge. Prandini, Riccardo (2011) “Transcendental Realism and Critical Naturalism in Roy Bhaskar: The Return of Ontology in Scientific Social Research”, in Andrea M. Maccarini, Emmanuele Morandi, and Riccardo Prandini, eds., Sociological Realism. New York: Routledge. Rumelili, Bahar (2007) Constructing Regional Community and Order in Europe and Southeast Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Sawyerr, Alice Akoshia Ayikaaley; and Bagley, Christopher Adam (2017) Equality and Ethnic Identities. Rotterdam: Sense Publishers. Scambler, Graham; and Scambler, Sasha (2015) “Theorizing Health Inequalities: The Untapped Potential of Dialectical Critical Realism”, Social Theory & Health, Vol.13, Issues 3-4, pp.340–354. Scauso, Marcos S. (2021) Intersectional Decoloniality: Reimagining International Relations and the Problem of Difference. New York: Routledge. Schreiber, D. A. (2015) Joined-up Knowledge for a Joined-up World: Critical Realism, Philosophy of Meta-Reality and the Emancipation in/of Anthropological Spirituality, an Exploration of Confluence (Dissertation), University of South Africa, Pretoria. Scott, David; and Bhaskar, Roy (2015) Roy Bhaskar: A Theory of Education. New York: Springer. Shih, Chih-yu et al. (2019) China and International Theory: The Balance of Relationships. New York: Routledge. Skinner, Quentin (2002) Visions of Politics: Regarding Method (Vol.1). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tsygankov, Andrei P. (2008) “Self and Other in International Relations Theory: Learning from Russian Civilizational Debates”, International Studies Review, Vol.10, Issue.4, pp.762-775. Vandenberghe, Frederic (2014) What's Critical about Critical Realism: Essays in Reconstructive Social Theory. New York: Routledge. --------------- (2015) “In Memoriam Roy Bhaskar (1944–2014)”, European Journal of Social Theory, 18(1), pp.112–114. Vukasović, Dejana (2018) “European Union and Otherness: The Case of the Balkans”, Sprawy Narodowościowe, 50(1-2). Wilson, Stacey-Ann (2012) “Reconstructing the Other in Post-Colonial International Relations: A Look at South-South Cooperation and Indigenous Globalism”, in Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, ed., Portraying the Other in International Relations. UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Yalvaç, Faruk (2014) “Approaches to Turkish Foreign Policy: A Critical Realist Analysis”, Turkish Studies, Vol.15, No.1, pp.117-138. Zhang, Tong (2023) “Critical Realism: A Critical Evaluation”, Social Epistemology, Vol.37, No.1, pp.15-29.       <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Corresponding Author: Professor of International Relations, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran. hoseinsalimi@yahoo.com <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> Ph.D Student in International Relations, Allameh Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran. mahmoodi.ramez@yahoo.com   در این مقاله، به دنبال پاسخ به این پرسش هستیم که «رئالیسم انتقادی دیالکتیکی، چه تأثیری بر فهم «دیگری» در روابط بینالملل دارد؟» فرضیة مقاله برای پاسخ به پرسش یادشده این است که رئالیسم انتقادی دیالکتیکی با پذیرش چندلایه بودن پدیدههای اجتماعی و هستیهای متکثر در معنای نااینهمانی در روابط بینالملل، دیالکتیک را نیز مکانیسم تغییر و شدن میداند که بر اثر آن، فهم متفاوتی از دیگری به&zwnj;مثابة هستی رئالیستی در روابط بینالملل شکل می&zwnj;گیرد. نگرش رئالیسم انتقادی دیالکتیکی را میتوان به &zwnj;عنوان رهیافت رهایی&zwnj;بخش در نظریه های پارادایم انتقادی برای شمول دیگریهای به حاشیه راندهشده به کار گرفت.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/48562

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922Asabiyyah as Discourse: Reconsidering Ibn Khaldun’s Theory through Foucault’s Discourse Analysisعصبیت به‌مثابه گفتمان: بازاندیشی در نظریۀ «ابن‌خلدون» از منظر تحلیل گفتمان «فوکو»205221fa متین انجم روزاستادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، واحد رشت، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، رشت، ایران2025223Asabiyyah as Discourse: Reconsidering Ibn Khaldun’s Theory through Foucault’s Discourse Analysis   Matin Anjomrooz<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a>   Ibn Khaldun’s theory of ‘‘asabiyyah’ and Foucault’s discourse analysis offer two distinct perspectives on social dynamics. The central question of this study is the possibility of reinterpreting asabiyyah as a historical discourse for the regulation of identity and power in pre-modern societies. The study aims to align these two theoretical frameworks along three axes: power, social transformation, and subject formation, using a theoretical and comparative analytical approach. The findings indicate that, like Foucauldian discourse, asabiyyah reproduces cohesion and authority through narratives and rituals, but it primarily emphasizes material factors, unlike Foucault’s focus on language-based constructs. This alignment elevates asabiyyah into a discursive construct, providing a tool for analyzing power both historically and in contemporary contexts. The results enrich the theoretical understanding of Ibn Khaldun and offer a framework for interdisciplinary analysis. It is suggested that this comparative approach be tested in empirical contexts, such as ethnic movements.   Keywords: asabiyyah, Ibn Khaldun, discourse analysis, Michel Foucault, power.   Introduction The concept of asabiyyah in Ibn Khaldun’s thought represents one of the most fundamental socio-political notions within the Islamic intellectual tradition. He considers asabiyyah the driving force behind historical and social transformations, asserting that no civilization can arise without strong asabiyyah, and no state can endure without it. From his perspective, asabiyyah is both a material and emotional bond that connects members of a tribe or group, uniting them against adversaries and facilitating the domination over rivals and the formation of governance. This force reaches its peak in nomadic societies but gradually weakens with urbanization and prosperity, ultimately being replaced by a new form of social cohesion. Within this framework, Ibn Khaldun explains the cyclical rise and fall of civilizations such as the Umayyads, Abbasids, Almoravids, and Ottomans, establishing himself as a pioneer of historical sociology. However, a notable limitation is that asabiyyah has predominantly been analyzed as a material and empirical phenomenon, with limited attention to its discursive and meaning-making dimensions. In contrast, in modern political philosophy, Michel Foucault locates power not in blood ties but within networks of discourse. According to him, it is discourse that produces knowledge, identity, and relations of domination. This theoretical tension frames the central research question of this study: Can asabiyyah be analyzed not merely as a material force but as a discourse that reproduced collective identity and power relations in pre-modern societies? This question is significant in two respects: first, it demonstrates how classical concepts can be reinterpreted in light of modern theoretical frameworks; and second, it opens a space for interdisciplinary dialogue between historical sociology, political philosophy, and discourse analysis.   Literature Review Numerous studies have examined the concept of asabiyyah. Rosenthal (1958) regarded it as central to Ibn Khaldun’s theory of civilization and compared it to modern social cohesion. Shayegan (1996) interprets asabiyyah as a pre-modern force in tension with modern rationality. However, most of these analyses have overlooked the discursive dimension of asabiyyah. In Western traditions, various theories of social cohesion have been proposed. Durkheim explains simple societies through the concept of “mechanical solidarity,” emphasizing kinship ties, while Weber analyzes charismatic authority based on emotional relationships. These perspectives share some similarities with Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyyah but lack his cyclical model. Marx, on the other hand, emphasizes productive relations in historical transformations, whereas asabiyyah primarily concerns tribal cohesion. Discourse studies were fundamentally reshaped by Foucault, who demonstrated that discourses are not mere reflections of reality but mechanisms that produce truth and power. For example, nineteenth-century medical discourse redefined the “patient,” creating an identity subject to institutional surveillance. The present research addresses a gap in systematically examining asabiyyah as a discourse. By filling this gap, it seeks to reinterpret asabiyyah not merely as a social force but as a discursive construct shaping identities and power relations in pre-modern societies.   Methodology This study employs a qualitative, comparative approach to examine the concept of asabiyyah in Ibn Khaldun’s thought and Foucault’s discourse theory. Primary data are drawn from Ibn Khaldun’s Muqaddimah (relying on Rosenthal’s translation) and key works by Foucault, including The Archaeology of Knowledge, The Order of Things, and Discipline and Punish. Secondary sources include authoritative interpretations by Dreyfus and Rabinow. The comparative method enables a systematic analysis of these two theories from different intellectual traditions, highlighting both convergences and divergences. It also allows for the reinterpretation of classical concepts in light of contemporary theory, enriching the theoretical discussion. The analytical process proceeded in three main stages: first, the extraction and clarification of core concepts of asabiyyah and discourse; second, a comparison of the two theories across the axes of power, social transformation, and subject formation; and finally, the redefinition of asabiyyah as a type of discourse in pre-modern societies. Although the study is primarily theoretical and lacks extensive empirical data, this focus allows for a deeper engagement with conceptual and theoretical issues.   Findings and Analysis In examining the concept of power, Ibn Khaldun considers asabiyyah fundamental to state formation. Tribes with strong asabiyyah, such as the Umayyads and Abbasids, were able to establish powerful states. This asabiyyah, combining emotional bonds and material interests, both strengthens group cohesion and legitimizes governance. In contrast, Foucault locates power not in individuals or institutions but in circulating discursive networks. Discourse simultaneously produces knowledge and reproduces power relations. This comparison suggests that asabiyyah can also function discursively: tribal poetry, ancestral myths, and loyalty rituals were all discourses that legitimized tribal governance. Regarding social transformation, Ibn Khaldun attributes the decline of civilizations to weakening asabiyyah, which is strongest in nomadic societies but diminishes with urbanization and prosperity. Foucault examines social transformations from the perspective of discursive ruptures—for instance, the transition from religious to scientific discourse in Europe represents a shift in knowledge and power systems. Thus, the decline of tribal asabiyyah and its replacement with religious discourse in the Abbasid era can be analyzed both materially (Ibn Khaldun) and discursively (Foucault). In terms of identity formation, Ibn Khaldun argues that individuals lack identity without tribal affiliation. Tribal rituals and narratives construct identities such as “warrior” or “tribe member.” Foucault similarly emphasizes the constructed nature of identity, showing how medical or legal discourses produce identities like “patient” or “criminal.” The key difference is that asabiyyah emphasizes collective subject formation, whereas Foucault focuses on individual subject formation in modern societies. Nevertheless, both perspectives highlight that identities are not inherent but constructed through dominant discourses.   Analytical and Interdisciplinary Expansion Asabiyyah can also be compared with modern social theories. Putnam’s concept of social capital allows asabiyyah to be viewed as a form of tribal social capital grounded in trust and kinship networks. Gellner’s analysis of ethnicity demonstrates that just as asabiyyah shaped collective identity in pre-modern societies, modern educational and cultural discourses construct ethnic identities. Laclau and Mouffe, emphasizing discourse in creating hegemony, interpret asabiyyah as a form of tribal hegemony that gives way to new discourses upon its decline. These perspectives indicate that asabiyyah is not merely a historical concept but an analytical model for understanding contemporary societies. Today, in the Middle East, ethnic and religious movements reproduce asabiyyah through modern discourses such as nationalism and Islamism, illustrating the ongoing discursive function of asabiyyah in contemporary politics.   Conclusion By reinterpreting Ibn Khaldun’s asabiyyah as a discourse, this study demonstrates that it was not merely a social force but a meaning-making system that regulated cohesion, legitimacy, and identity. This approach yields three main contributions: first, it extends Ibn Khaldun’s theory beyond sociological description, linking it to contemporary discourse theory; second, it provides an interdisciplinary framework for analyzing contemporary socio-political movements; and third, it highlights the potential of classical concepts for reinterpretation in light of modern theory. Nevertheless, limitations such as theoretical focus, lack of empirical data, and methodological differences between the two intellectual traditions exist. Future research is recommended to proceed in three directions: empirical study of asabiyyah in contemporary ethnic movements, its integration with other discourse theories, and reinterpretation of other Ibn Khaldunian concepts (such as ‘‘umran) from this perspective. These avenues can further enrich the theoretical capacity of this analytical framework.   References Ahmad, A. (2003) Islam, modernity, and the human sciences. Palgrave Macmillan. Butler, J. (1997) The psychic life of power: Theories in subjection. Stanford University Press. Dhaouadi, M. (1990) Ibn Khaldun: The founding father of eastern sociology. International Sociology, 5(3), 319–335. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1177/026858090005003007">https://doi.org/10.1177/026858090005003007</a> Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1983) Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press. Fairclough, N. (1992) Discourse and social change. Polity Press. Foucault, M. (1971) The order of discourse. In R. Young (Ed.), Untying the text: A post-structuralist reader (pp. 51–78). Routledge. (Original work published 1970) Foucault, M. (1972) The archaeology of knowledge (A. M. Sheridan Smith, Trans.). Pantheon Books. (Original work published 1969) Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (A. Sheridan, Trans.). Vintage Books. (Original work published 1975) Gellner, E. (1981) Muslim society. Cambridge University Press. Hodgson, G. S. (1974) The venture of Islam: Conscience and history in a world civilization (Vol. 1). University of Chicago Press. Ibn Khaldun. (2005) The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history (F. Rosenthal, Trans.). Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1377). Lacoste, Y. (1984) Ibn Khaldun: The birth of history and the past of the Third World. Verso. Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985) Hegemony and socialist strategy: Towards a radical democratic politics. Verso. Mills, S. (2003) Michel Foucault. Routledge. Rosenthal, F. (1958) Introduction. In Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An introduction to history (Vol. 1, pp. xxvii–xxxii). Princeton University Press. Shayegan, D. (1996) Cultural schizophrenia: Islamic societies confronting the West. Syracuse University Press. van Dijk, T. A. (1998) Ideology: A multidisciplinary approach. Sage.   <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities, Rasht Branch, Islamic Azad University, Rasht, Iran. <a href="mailto:matin.anjomrooz@gmail.com">matin.anjomrooz@gmail.com</a>نظریه عصبیت ابن خلدون و تحلیل گفتمان فوکو، دو دیدگاه متفاوت به پویایی&zwnj;های اجتماعی ارائه می&zwnj;دهد. مسئله این پژوهش، امکان بازخوانی عصبیت به&zwnj;مثابه گفتمان تاریخی برای تنظیم هویت و قدرت در جوامع پیشامدرن است. هدف، تطبیق این دو نظریه در سه محور قدرت، تحول اجتماعی و سوژه&zwnj;سازی با روش تحلیل نظری و تطبیقی است. یافته&zwnj;ها نشان می&zwnj;دهد که عصبیت مانند گفتمان فوکویی، از طریق روایت&zwnj;ها و آیین&zwnj;ها، انسجام و سلطه را بازتولید می&zwnj;کند، اما بر عوامل مادی متمرکز است؛ برخلاف تأکید فوکو که بر سازه&zwnj;های زبانی مبتنی است. این تطبیق، عصبیت را به یک سازه گفتمانی ارتقا داده، ابزاری برای تحلیل قدرت در تاریخ و امروز ارائه می&zwnj;دهد. نتایج، درک نظریه ابن&zwnj;خلدون را غنی&zwnj;تر کرده، چارچوبی برای تحلیل میان&zwnj;رشته&zwnj;ای ارائه می&zwnj;دهد. پیشنهاد می&zwnj;شود این تطبیق در بسترهای تجربی، مانند جنبش&zwnj;های قومی نیز آزمایش شود.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/49537

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922Artificial Intelligence and the Transformation of Political Subjectivity: In Search of a Solutionهوش مصنوعی و تحول سوبژکتیویته سیاسی: در جست‌وجوی یک راه‌حل223252faمنصورانصارياستادیار گروه اندیشه سیاسی پژوهشکده امام خمینی و انقلاب اسلامی، تهران، ایران سامانمهدانیانکارشناس علوم کامپیوتر، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران 0009-0005-9849-89472025528Artificial Intelligence and the Transformation of Political Subjectivity: In Search of a Solution   Mansour Ansari<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Saman Mahdanian<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a>   The fundamental transformation of artificial intelligence technologies in recent decades has led to an ontological and political challenge to the modern concept of the "subject" and "political subjectivity." This article, by posing the question "What fate will human political subjectivity face in the age of algorithmic governance?" seeks to examine the relationship between algorithmic power, the decline of human will, and the possibility of reconstructing political action. In response, two major approaches are explored: first, a pessimistic view that assumes the end of human subjectivity in the data-driven age; and second, a view that considers the possibility of reconstructing or reviving the political subject through new philosophical approaches. The research method is analytical-interpretive with an interdisciplinary approach that links concepts of modern political philosophy with contemporary technological developments. The findings of the study indicate that redefining subjectivity is only possible through the recognition of cognitive privacy, the right to independent thought, and the reconstruction of the field of intersubjective dialogue.   Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Algorithmic Governance, Political Subjectivity, Hannah Arendt, Political Action. <h3 style="text-align: left;"> </h3> <h3 style="text-align: left;">Introduction</h3> These days, artificial intelligence is rapidly entering the daily lives of humans and is expected to become a commonplace tool in the not-so-distant future. Initially, at least in a country like Iran, its entertaining and humorous aspect was more prominent, and shortly thereafter, this joke- and laughter-based interaction gave way to greater astonishment and wonder. The root of this amazement returns to the question: with this technology, what becomes of our role as humans in life and work? This intelligence, whose origin is unclear, to what extent will it surpass human intellect and intelligence? And if someday artificial intelligence becomes powerful enough to compete and clash with humans, what will happen to humanity? These questions, now common currency in public discourse, have been the subject of extensive and wide-ranging research over the past couple of decades. A multitude of small and large, philosophical and social, simple and complex, light and weighty studies have been produced on this topic. Although there is much disagreement and dispute over its technical and non-technical aspects, there is almost complete consensus on one point: artificial intelligence will transform human life in such a way that none of the previous innovations and events can compare in terms of importance and impact. In response to the question of what will happen to the political subject in the age of artificial intelligence, at least two perspectives exist: those who believe that in the age of AI dominance, political subjectivity will be completely destroyed, and those who believe that by reconstructing the concept of human political subjectivity, a path to its salvation can be found. In this article, while examining the arguments of both groups, we aim to show that although artificial intelligence has fundamentally challenged the foundation of human political subjectivity, by drawing on the intellectual foundations of great thinkers like Hannah Arendt—who faced the crisis of the political subject decades ago—a meaningful solution can be found. Research Method In theoretical research, especially in fields such as philosophy, political science, and critical theory, the analytical method based on argumentation holds a foundational place. This method does not focus on collecting empirical data but rather on precise conceptual analysis, evaluation of argumentative structures, and clarification of theoretical assumptions. The researcher in this approach seeks to examine propositions for logical coherence and argumentative strength using the tools of critical rationality and to reach rational judgments about complex issues through conceptual analysis. In the present article, an effort has been made to provide precise conceptual clarification, analyze the arguments concerning artificial intelligence and its impact on human subjectivity, and then propose an alternative idea to preserve human subjectivity. Artificial Intelligence and the Decline of Political Subjectivity The concept of the subject and political subjectivity has been under serious critique from the outset. With the emergence of the digital world and the rise of artificial intelligence, researchers such as Shoshana Zuboff, Bernard Stiegler, Katharina Hiels, Benjamin Bratton, and others—mostly following a Foucauldian approach—have sought to provide broader analyses of the decline of human subjectivity in relation to AI. Given the deep crisis of subjectivity in the age of artificial intelligence, theorists and philosophers engaged in this field have proposed solutions. These solutions can be categorized into several approaches:   Existentialist Revival of the Subject Han, in his book The Expulsion of the Other, proposes an existentialist solution for reviving the human and political subject. In his view, in a digital culture where humans only encounter what they like, think, and prefer—and where there is no place for the Other—the only solution is to revive the subject through the Other: “Only the Other allows us to experience the world and ourselves anew” (Han, 2018: 2).   Epistemological Solution Rouvroy, in her effort to revive the human subject, believes that a qualitative distinction must be reconstructed between human life and statistical data receptivity. She argues that this requires defending the right to error. Error should not be eliminated from human life but preserved as part of human freedom. Only where error is possible, freedom is also possible.   Legal Solution Zuboff, a prominent researcher in the field of artificial intelligence, believes that the most important solution for reviving human subjectivity is drafting a Universal Declaration of Cognitive Rights, which recognizes the right to mental privacy and the right to think without machine intervention (Zuboff, 2019: 485). She also believes this right requires full transparency of platforms and governmental regulation.   Hybrid Subject Katharina Hiels is one of the few thinkers who, avoiding nostalgia for a return to the modern subject, opens a path to confronting the complex reality of the data and automation age. She suggests that we must distance ourselves from consciousness to become subjects again—a subject that is not independent but continuous, multi-layered, and engaged with a hybrid cognitive world. Reconstructing the Arendtian Solution: Reviving Politics as Reviving Political Subjectivity Margaret Canovan, in describing Arendt’s work, said she is one of the few thinkers who always allows us to look at familiar matters from a different angle, and her power of innovation lies precisely in her different perspective (Ansari, 2000: 177). Arendt proposed her ideas during a time when the specter of totalitarianism had brought the world to ruin. Young Arendt began her intellectual work with the question: where did this catastrophe come from? The human world was on the brink of collapse, and savagery, violence, and war had engulfed humanity. In the totalitarian situation, the machine of violence had called human subjectivity into question—just like the current situation with the emergence of artificial intelligence. As mentioned in the introduction, with the rise and hegemony of AI, the question has arisen in public discourse: what will happen to human thought, reason, and intelligence? Using Hannah Arendt’s political thought to explain new and emerging matters such as artificial intelligence requires elaborating on many nuances of her ideas, which is not possible in this article and necessitates selective focus (for more on Arendt’s political thought, see: Ansari, 2000). Among the wide range of concepts and themes Arendt developed, two concepts—“action” and “thinking”—which are more closely related to human political subjectivity, are more relevant to this article. It should be noted that Arendt fundamentally opposed the modern interpretation of subjectivity, politics, economy, society, and revolution, and her thought developed in contrast to modern intellectual traditions. Therefore, if we define human subjectivity as the capacity and will to determine one’s political destiny and nature, then the concepts of political action and thinking will regain their proper meaning. The concept of action and politics in Arendt’s thought was proposed in response to the loss of human agency during the darkness of totalitarianism. Arendt’s question at that time is strikingly similar to the question now being asked in reaction to the loss of human subjectivity in the age of artificial intelligence. Although one was a curse and the other a blessing, the critical issue has been the loss of human subjectivity and humanity. Arendt’s response to the rise of totalitarianism was the death of politics and action. In her view, action is what distinguishes humans from all other beings and makes them unique.   Conclusion The transformation of political subjectivity in the age of artificial intelligence is more than a merely technological or theoretical issue. It is, in fact, a fundamental and existential question about the nature of humanity, the essence of freedom, and the fate of politics in the contemporary world. In the past, the political subject was recognized as a conscious, responsible, and active being who, based on will and choice, could participate in public and political spheres, make decisions, and shape the future. But with the emergence of artificial intelligence and the development of advanced algorithms that possess capabilities beyond direct human control and understanding, we are witnessing a profound—and perhaps revolutionary—transformation in the concept of the political subject: a transformation that turns the subject from an independent being into an entity whose behavior is regulated and controlled by data, predictions, and algorithmic trends. This transition, occurring alongside the growing influence of digital technologies and social networks, seriously questions the foundations of modern political philosophy and even challenges the very meaning of being human. In this context, Hannah Arendt’s thought offers us a different and profound perspective. By redefining concepts such as political action and thinking, Arendt reminds us that authentic politics is rooted not in efficient management of affairs but in the possibility of initiating action, intersubjective dialogue, and appearing in the public realm. Algorithms, no matter how complex, cannot “begin,” because they lack lived experience, individual difference, and the concern of being with others. Therefore, the main danger of artificial intelligence is not merely the replacement of humans in tasks, but the replacement of political action with technocratic decisions.   References Abensour, M. (2011) Democracy against the state: Marx and the Machiavellian movement. Polity Press. Althusser, L. (1971) Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (Notes towards an investigation). In B. Brewster (Trans.), Lenin and philosophy and other essays (pp. 127–186). Monthly Review Press. Ansari, M. (2000) Hannah Arendt and the critique of political philosophy. Markaz. [In Persian/Farsi] Arendt, H. (1951) The origins of totalitarianism. Harcourt Brace. Arendt, H. (1958) The human condition. University of Chicago Press. Arendt, H. (1961) Between past and future: Eight exercises in political thought. Penguin. Arendt, H. (1978) The life of the mind. Harcourt. Arendt, H. (1982) Lectures on Kant’s political philosophy. University of Chicago Press. BarthemeB, F., & Furbach, U. (2023) AlphaZero and artificial reason. Springer. Bostrom, N., & Yudkowsky, E. (2014) The ethics of artificial intelligence. In K. Frankish & W. M. Ramsey (Eds.), The Cambridge handbook of artificial intelligence (pp. 316–334). Cambridge University Press. Brunnhuber, S. (2024) The third culture: The impact of AI on knowledge, society and consciousness in the 21st century. Springer Nature Switzerland. Butler, J. (1990) Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. Routledge. Dennett, D. C. (1992) Consciousness explained. Little, Brown and Company. Dreyfus, H. L. (1972) What computers can't do: A critique of artificial reason. Harper & Row. Floridi, L. (2013) The ethics of information. Oxford University Press. Foucault, M. (1982) The subject and power. Critical Inquiry, 8(4), 777–795. Foucault, M. (2001) Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison (N. Sarkhosh & A. Jahandideh, Trans.). Nashr-e Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Foucault, M. (2011) The will to knowledge (N. Sarkhosh & A. Jahandideh, Trans.). Nashr-e Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Han, B.-C. (2017) Psychopolitics: Neoliberalism and new technologies of power. Verso. Han, B.-C. (2018) The expulsion of the other: Society, perception and communication today. Polity Press. Han, B.-C. (2017) Facebook philosopher: An introduction to the thought of Byung-Chul Han (A. Barzegar, Trans.). Tarjomaan Website. [In Persian/Farsi] Hayles, N. K. (2017) Unthought: The power of the cognitive nonconscious. University of Chicago Press. Jorion, P. (2024) L’avènement de la singularité: L’humain ébranlé par l’intelligence artificielle. Textuel. Kant, I. (1991) An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment? (H. B. Nisbet, Trans.). In H. Reiss (Ed.), Kant: Political writings (pp. 54–60). Cambridge University Press. (Original work published 1784) Kurzweil, R. (1999) The age of spiritual machines: When computers exceed human intelligence. Viking Press. Kurzweil, R. (2005) The singularity is near: When humans transcend biology. Viking Press. Lacan, J. (1966) Écrits. Seuil. Luger, G. F. (2025) Artificial intelligence: Principles and practice. Springer Nature Switzerland. Minsky, M. (1986) The society of mind. Simon & Schuster. Rouvroy, A. (2013) The end(s) of critique: Data behaviorism versus due process. In M. Hildebrandt & K. de Vries (Eds.), Privacy, due process and the computational turn (pp. 143–168). Routledge. Rouvroy, A. (2016) Algorithmic governmentality and the end of critique. Transversal Texts. https://transversal.at Rouvroy, A., & Berns, T. (2013) Algorithmic governmentality and prospects of emancipation. Réseaux, 177(1), 163–196. <a href="https://doi.org/10.3917/res.177.0163">https://doi.org/10.3917/res.177.0163</a> Rouvroy, A., & Stiegler, B. (2013) The digital regime of truth: From the algorithmic governmentality to a new rule of law. La Deleuziana, (1), 319–336. Searle, J. R. (1980) Minds, brains, and programs. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3(3), 417–424. <a href="https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756">https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00005756</a> Taylor, C. (1989) Sources of the self: The making of the modern identity. Harvard University Press. Teuscher, C. (Ed.). (2004) Alan Turing: Life and legacy of a great thinker. Springer. Turing, A. M. (1950) Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind, 59(236), 433–460. https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433 Vallor, S. (2016). Technology and the virtues: A philosophical guide to a future worth wanting. Oxford University Press. Williamson, T. (2007) The philosophy of philosophy. Blackwell Publishing. Zuboff, S. (2019) The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. Public Affairs.           <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Corresponding Author: Assistant Professor, Political Thought Department, Imam Khomeini and Islamic Revolution Research Institute, Tehran, Iran. m.ansari51@gmail.com <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> B.A. in Computer Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. mahdanian.saman@gmail.comتحول بنیادین فناوری&zwnj;های هوش مصنوعی در دهه&zwnj;های اخیر، به چالشی هستی&zwnj;شناختی و سیاسی برای مفهوم مدرن «سوژه» و «سوبژکتیویته سیاسی» انجامیده است. این مقاله با طرح این پرسش که «سوژه&zwnj;گی سیاسی انسان در عصر حکمرانی الگوریتمی، چه سرنوشتی خواهد یافت؟» بر آن است تا نسبت میان قدرت الگوریتمی، زوال اراده انسانی و امکان بازسازی کنش سیاسی را واکاوی کند. در پاسخ، دو رویکرد عمده بررسی می&zwnj;شود: نخست، دیدگاهی بدبینانه که پایان سوژه&zwnj;گی انسان را در عصر داده&zwnj;محور مفروض می&zwnj;گیرد و دوم، دیدگاهی که امکان بازسازی یا احیای سوژه سیاسی را از خلال رویکردهای فلسفی جدید ممکن می&zwnj;داند. روش تحقیق، تحلیلی- تفسیری با رویکردی بین&zwnj;رشته&zwnj;ای است که مفاهیم فلسفه سیاسی مدرن را با تحولات فناوری معاصر پیوند می&zwnj;زند. یافته&zwnj;های پژوهش نشان می&zwnj;دهد که بازتعریف سوژه&zwnj;گی، تنها در صورت به &zwnj;رسمیت شناختن حریم شناختی، حق تفکر مستقل و بازسازی میدان گفت&zwnj;وگوی بین&zwnj;الاذهانی ممکن خواهد بود.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/50397

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922Analyzing “utopia” and “dystopia” using the “history of concepts” methodتحلیل «اتوپیا» و «دیستوپیا» با روش «تاریخ مفاهیم»253280faمحدثهتیموریدانشجوی کارشناسی ارشد علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، ایرانعباس منوچهریاستاد گروه علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، ایران2024518Analyzing “utopia” and “dystopia” using the “history of concepts” method   Mohaddeseh Teymouri<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Abbas Manouchehri<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a>   The concepts of “utopia” and “dystopia” hold particular significance in civil (political) philosophy and political literature. To date, numerous works have addressed these concepts in both primary and secondary texts, offering criticism and analysis. Despite this extensive scholarship, no study has applied a “conceptual-historical” approach based on Reinhart Koselleck’s method to investigate these ideas. This article aims to demonstrate, using Koselleck’s framework, that the meanings of utopia and dystopia cannot be reduced to fixed definitions. Such an approach provides a novel perspective for understanding the evolution of concepts throughout the history of human thought. The study emphasizes the role of historical context and temporality, uncovering hidden or often overlooked dimensions of these concepts.   Keywords: utopia, dystopia, conceptual history, political thought, Koselleck.   Introduction and Problem Statement The concepts of “utopia” and “dystopia” have consistently occupied an important position in civil (political) philosophy and political literature. Throughout the history of thought, whenever humans have sought solutions to crises or aimed to achieve better conditions of life, traces of utopian thinking are observable. Civil-political thinkers, operating in fields such as political philosophy, political ideology, political theology, and political literature, often respond to contemporary crises by envisioning alternative arrangements and proposing solutions, thereby bridging the gap between existing realities and desirable futures. Political thought can thus be considered a prime example of normative reasoning, in which the political thinker, observing the current state of crisis, seeks to imagine what ought to be—an ideal arrangement. These concepts, particularly in periods of crisis, have served as theoretical tools for analyzing social and political conditions. However, previous research has primarily focused on ideological or literary analyses, rarely adopting a conceptual-historical perspective. This article seeks to provide a new reading of these two concepts through Reinhart Koselleck’s method of conceptual history. The study aims to examine how the meanings of utopia and dystopia have shifted across different historical contexts and how these concepts, in each period, revealed their unique potentials and limitations.   Theoretical Foundations and Literature Review The first section of this article reviews the contributions of scholars such as Ruth Levitas, Karl Mannheim, Karl Popper, Paul Ricoeur, and Ernst Bloch. Levitas, a British sociologist, in works such as The Concept of Utopia (1930) and Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society (2013), presents utopias as a desire for better ways of being and living, highlighting the necessity of imagining and reconstructing society both in thought and reality. She emphasizes that utopias should not be considered merely as goals but as methodological frameworks. Mannheim (1936), in Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, explores the relationship between ideology and utopia, arguing that both emerge from political struggles. While he stresses the importance of ideologies, he ultimately considers utopia more significant and warns that its absence would result in human stagnation, rendering individuals lifeless. Paul Ricoeur, aware of the dangers of imaginative creation, argues that utopias reveal possibilities for alternative arrangements of power. He identifies three primary functions of utopias: a social dimension, wherein utopias explore the realm of possibility; a political dimension, in which utopias provide the necessary distance to critique society, ideology, or the status quo and may even legitimize power; and a cautionary dimension, in which utopia may devolve into mere fantasy. Each of these scholars examines utopia from a different perspective, ranging from its cognitive function to its role in critiquing existing conditions. Critical perspectives, particularly from Popper and other liberal thinkers, have also been analyzed. For instance, in The Open Society and Its Enemies, Popper critiques the Platonic idea of the ideal state, portraying it as dystopian. He characterizes utopias as containing fixed designs and immutable laws, which can ultimately foster authoritarianism and suppress individual freedom.   Methodology Reinhart Koselleck’s conceptual-historical method serves as the theoretical framework of this study. Koselleck’s Begriffsgeschichte (conceptual history) offers a distinctive approach to studying the history of ideas, emphasizing that concepts such as utopia and dystopia evolve in response to historical experiences and societal expectations. Their meanings vary according to the social, political, and cultural conditions of each era. Consequently, this method employs a linguistic-historical analysis to study past social relations and conditions, revealing new layers of meaning embedded in historical transformations. Koselleck argues that without concepts, neither society nor political action can exist. He critiques purely linguistic analyses, insisting on integrating historical, social, and political data. The meaning of classical concepts is thus embedded in their historical usage, linking the intentions of thinkers to the interpretive frameworks of their contemporaries. In other words, Koselleck’s conceptual-historical approach treats the study of language as inseparable from the social conditions in which concepts were deployed.   Findings and Conceptual Analysis The core of the article is devoted to the historical analysis of utopia and dystopia. First, the concept of utopia is examined, tracing its evolution from Plato’s Republic to Thomas More’s Utopia and the socialist utopias of the nineteenth century. The analysis demonstrates that classical utopias often focused on presenting an ideal society, whereas twentieth-century thinkers, such as Ernst Bloch, introduced the concept of “not-yet,” providing a more dynamic approach to utopia as a motivating force for social and political change. Bloch identifies the “most tragic form of loss” as the loss of the capacity to envision alternative conditions. According to him, humans are not yet fully human; human existence is filled with unfulfilled desires and dreams, and reality contains potential futures that are not yet realized. Bloch’s philosophy can be interpreted as a quest for a renewed life, oriented toward what is not yet actualized and the transformation of the world in relation to what could be. He posits that one of the most remarkable aspects of human life is the pursuit of these ideals through utopian projection, embodying dreams and circulating visions. The concept of dystopia is then analyzed. Particularly in the twentieth century, dystopia gained prominence in both political philosophy and literature. Writers such as Yevgeny Zamyatin (We), Aldous Huxley (Brave New World), George Orwell (1984), and Ray Bradbury (Fahrenheit 451) depicted societies where individual freedoms are severely restricted and humans are subjected to totalitarian control, offering a grim vision of the future. This section examines the influence of historical events, including world wars, the rise of totalitarian regimes, and the development of surveillance technologies, on the proliferation of dystopian literature. The article also demonstrates that dystopias are present not only in literature but also in political philosophy. In this sense, the crisis-ridden present of any given society can itself be understood as dystopian. For example, Hannah Arendt, as a political thinker, analyzed twentieth-century crises from a distinctive perspective. In works such as The Origins of Totalitarianism and The Human Condition, she examines societies in which freedom, plurality, and human action have been supplanted by domination and alienation. Arendt argues that “the world of alienation” characterizes the modern era, wherein individuals become detached from their environment and fellow humans, ultimately losing spontaneity under terror, the essence of totalitarianism. She emphasizes concepts such as citizenship, action, and the strengthening of the public sphere as pathways to overcome contemporary crises, envisioning alternative arrangements grounded in solidarity, plurality, and civic friendship.   Conclusion This study demonstrates that utopia and dystopia are not static concepts but fluid, multilayered, and context-dependent. In different historical contexts, they reflect the specific crises, hopes, and fears of their time. Conceptual history reminds us that meaning is not absolute or predetermined but is formed through interaction with social and cognitive contexts. Utopias, contrary to some critiques, are not mere fantasies but provide possibilities for imagining alternative futures and critiquing the present. Similarly, dystopias are not simply pessimistic predictions; they serve as warnings, illuminating mechanisms of domination and the risks of modern civilization. Ultimately, utopia and dystopia act as mirrors reflecting the conditions of their times while offering opportunities to think about the future. In today’s world, confronted with environmental crises, economic inequalities, and political threats, revisiting these concepts can aid in understanding and creating alternative pathways for the future.   References Arendt, B. R. (2022) Utopianism: Belief in the Ideal City (M. Nasravi, Trans.). Tehran: Afkar-e Jadid. [In Persian/Farsi] Arendt, H. (2022) The Human Condition (M. Aliya, Trans.). Tehran: Ghoghnoos. [In Persian/Farsi] Biesterfeld, W. (1982) Die literarische Utopie (2nd ed.). Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler. Bloch, E. (2022) The Principle of Hope (S. Taheri, Trans.). Tehran: Afkar-e Jadid. [In Persian/Farsi] Bradbury, R. (2023) Fahrenheit 451 (M. Daqiqi, Trans.). Tehran: Mahi. [In Persian/Farsi] Bradshaw, L. (2022) Hannah Arendt’s Political Philosophy (K. Diehimi, Trans.). Tehran: Farhang Nashr No. [In Persian/Farsi] Chignola, S. (2002) History of political thought and the history of political concepts: Koselleck's proposal and Italian research. Engels, F. (2017) Utopian and Scientific Socialism (Trans.). Tehran: Roshangaran. [In Persian/Farsi] Hassing, A. (2015) What is Conceptual History? Held, D. (2022) Models of Democracy (A. Mokhber, Trans.). Tehran: Roshangaran va Motaleat-e Zanan. [In Persian/Farsi] Hesiod. (2018) Work and Days. Penguin Classics. Huxley, A. L. (2023) Brave New World (S. Hamidian, Trans.). Tehran: Niloufar. [In Persian/Farsi] Jacques, P. W. (2020) Politics and Utopia (J. Mohammadi, Trans.). Tehran: Farhang-e Javid. [In Persian/Farsi] Jazayi, M., et al. (2020) “Conceptual History: Revealing Ideological Conflicts and Understanding the New Meaning of Text.” Naqd va Nazariye Adabi, 5(2), 75–96. [In Persian/Farsi] Koselleck, R. (1982) Begriffsgeschichte and social history. Economy and Society, 11(4), 409–427. Koselleck, R. (2002) The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Stanford University Press. Kozlek, R. (2022) Introduction to Basic Historical Concepts: History of the Concept of Crisis (B. Joudi, Trans.). Tehran: Gam No. [In Persian/Farsi] Levitas, R. (2013) Utopia as Method: The Imaginary Reconstitution of Society. New York: Palgrave. Mahmoudi, R., et al. (2022) “Phenomenology of Ideology and Its Relationship with Utopia Based on Paul Ricoeur’s Views.” Pazhuhesh-ha-ye Falsafi, 16(40), 336–359. [In Persian/Farsi] Menochehri, A. (2004) Hermeneutics of Liberation and Civic Mysticism (H. Khandaq Abadi, Trans.). Tehran: Moasas-e Tahghighat va Tose’e-ye Olum-e Ensani. [In Persian/Farsi] Menochehri, A. (2023) Beyond Suffering and Dream. Tehran: Rozaneh. [In Persian/Farsi] More, T. (1516/2016). Utopia (H. V. S. Ogden, Ed. & Trans.). Crofts Classics. Ric&oelig;ur, P. (2020) Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (M. Faezi, Trans.). Tehran: Markaz. [In Persian/Farsi] Sartajant, L. T. (2022) Utopianism: Belief in Ideal Society (M. Nasravi, Trans.). Tehran: Afkar-e Jadid. [In Persian/Farsi] Shariati, A. (2013) Collected Works, Vol. 25: The Selfless Human. Tehran: Institute for the Works of Dr. Shariati. [In Persian/Farsi] Vieira, F. (2010) “The Concept of Utopia.” In The Cambridge Companion to Utopian Literature, 3–27. Weller, S. (2018) Red Bry: Last Interview and Other Conversations (M. Mardani, Trans.). Tehran: Salis. [In Persian/Farsi] Zamyatin, Y. I. (2020) We (B. Shahab, Trans.). Tehran: Bidgol. [In Persian/Farsi]     <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Corresponding Author: M.A Student in Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran. mohadesehteymori13@gmail.com <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> Professor, Department of Political Science, Tarbiat Modares University, Iran. amanoochehri@yahoo.comمفاهیم «اتوپیا» (آرمان- شهر) و «دیستوپیا» (ویران- شهر) در «فلسفه مدنی (سیاسی)» و «ادب سیاسی»، اهمیتی خاص دارد. تاکنون آثار زیادی درباره هر دو مفهوم به صورت متون اصلی و ثانوی نوشته و مورد نقد و تحلیل واقع شده است. علی&zwnj;رغم تمامی تحقیقات صورتگرفته، تاکنون پژوهشی «مفهوم&zwnj;شناسانه» با استفاده از روش «تاریخ مفاهیم» راینهارد کوزلک انجام نشده است. هدف این مقاله این است که با استفاده از روش کوزلک نشان داده شود که نمیتوان معنای دو مفهوم اتوپیا و دیستوپیا را به معانی مشخصی تقلیل داد. این روش منجر به دیدگاهی جدید برای درک تطور مفاهیم در طول تاریخ اندیشه بشر خواهد شد. در این مقاله سعی شده تا با تأکید بر نقش زمینه و زمانه در هر دوره تاریخی، زوایای پنهان و گاه فراموششده این مفاهیم بررسی شود.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/46750

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922The Philosophical Foundations of the Grammatological Reading of the Political in Derrida's Thoughtبنیان‌های فلسفی خوانش گراماتولوژیک از امر سیاسی در اندیشه دریدا281298faحامد علی اکبرزادهاستادیار گروه فلسفه، دانشکده ادبیات و علوم انسانی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران202555The Philosophical Foundations of the Grammatological Reading of the Political in Derrida's Thought   Hamed Aliakbarzadeh<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a>   This article first examines the way Jacques Derrida’s philosophical project connects to the political realm, demonstrating how his grammatological interpretation of being opens a pathway toward contingent and practical domains, particularly the political sphere. The article then explores the implications of this project, showing that Derrida’s political philosophy is less a fixed or determinate framework and more an effort to liberate political thought from rigid and systematic forms characteristic of both classical and modern philosophy. His approach enables the deconstruction, reconstruction, and continuous formation of new ideas within the political domain.   Keywords: Derrida, grammatology, politics, justice, democracy.   Introduction A central component of any philosophical idea is its connection to contingent realities such as politics, law, economics, and society. If a philosophical idea cannot establish such a connection, it is likely to be excluded from meaningful philosophical discourse. Philosophers have historically sought to create these links, and many contemporary thinkers focus on questions of language, arguing that it is through the linguistic context of thought that philosophical ideas relate to culture, society, and other contingent domains. Jacques Derrida’s philosophy, like many contemporary European philosophies, is closely tied to language. By emphasizing the linguistic dimension, Derrida establishes the science of “grammatology,” through which he opens a path toward examining contingent domains, especially the political realm, including concepts such as democracy and justice. This article first explores how Derrida conceives of being as a textual and linguistic phenomenon and then shows how, through grammatology, he links his philosophical ideas to political concerns. It further demonstrates the consequences of this linkage for Derrida’s political philosophy.   The Linguistic Fabric of Being in Derrida’s Philosophy Derrida’s philosophical project begins with a critical engagement with the history of Western philosophy, which he regards as dominated by “logocentrism.” Understanding logocentrism requires recognizing that, in Derrida’s view, Western metaphysics—from Plato to the present—rests upon binary oppositions, such as substance/accident, universal/particular, finite/infinite, and speech/writing. These oppositions constitute the foundation of metaphysical thought in the West. According to Derrida, the privileging of speech over writing originates in Plato, particularly in the Phaedrus, where speech is favored over writing. In this framework, speech conveys the speaker’s immediate thought more directly than writing, making speech a representation of presence, while writing, as a mere transcript, represents absence. Speech is associated with revelation and the unfolding of truth, whereas writing is linked to memory and deferral. From Plato onward, Western philosophy has maintained this privileging of speech over writing—a metaphysics of presence. Derrida terms this historical dominance “the metaphysics of presence.” Logocentrism, in his analysis, is another expression of this metaphysics, an enduring rationalism oriented toward speech and presence. Derrida observes that this speech-centered orientation manifests in philosophical concepts such as substance, essence, existence, consciousness, and subjectivity. In the history of Western metaphysics, the predominance of speech over writing effectively defers and marginalizes the Other. When the Other is negated or relegated, there is little space for social or political engagement. To address the political realm, Derrida seeks a foundation for knowledge that allows access to the Other.     Grammatology: The Condition for the Contingency of Philosophy In developing this science, Derrida shifts emphasis from speech to writing. This move is not merely linguistic but establishes a new mode of thinking about being, which he names grammatology. Grammatology is a comprehensive science in which writing is central. The primacy of writing corresponds to the primacy of the Other. This shift from speech to writing represents a fundamental reorientation away from the logocentric metaphysics of Western philosophy. Grammatology enables reflection on being as textual and written. By conceptualizing being in this manner, Derrida opens a new horizon for engaging with contingent realities. He develops a strategy, called “deconstruction,” to systematically account for the linguistic and textual aspects of philosophical reflection.   The Strategy of Deconstruction Central to deconstruction is the problem of meaning. Meaning is established through differences from other meanings, yet this establishment is always inherently unstable. Consequently, there is no fixed, central, or overarching meaning; each concept must be continuously decentered. Deconstruction is therefore a strategy of non-determination dependent on the Other. By employing deconstruction, Derrida creates space for the Other, thereby opening the possibility of a political domain oriented toward the Other. But how does Derrida, through grammatology and deconstruction, engage political concepts?   The Political and Its Relation to Derrida’s Philosophical Ideas For Derrida, political concepts, like all concepts, are in constant flux and indeterminate. They continuously evolve, and no fixed or complete realization is ever achieved. Thus, concepts such as democracy or justice are perpetually unfolding, never fully attainable.   Democracy Democracy, from Derrida’s perspective, is always in a state of becoming. It is endless—“democracy to come.” Its meaning is continually in the process of realization, yet never fully captured. Democracy is not a completed system but an ongoing project, requiring perpetual reflection and reassessment.   Justice Derrida’s approach to justice follows a similar logic. Justice is impossible—not in the sense of being unattainable, but always deferred. True justice is always on its way; it is justice in process. Experiencing justice involves confronting the uncalculable and engaging with uncertainty. As Derrida suggests, justice is like a guest who always arrives late—yet this very delay enables critical reflection and ethical engagement.   Conclusion For Derrida, written language provides the starting point for speaking about reality and being. Grammatology allows engagement with being as a linguistic phenomenon. From this perspective, all ideas and concepts, including political concepts, are subject to deconstruction. Deconstruction challenges the stability, determinacy, and realizability of concepts. In Derrida’s thought, no political concept remains fixed; they are continually recreated, inspiring movement, reflection, and renewal. Derrida represents the beginning of a new approach to Western political philosophy—a beginning without a predetermined end. Derridean politics is an “impossible politics,” seeking liberation from rigid frameworks in order to enable continuous self-reconstruction. The most significant implication of Derrida’s approach is that concepts such as democracy and justice shift from being static political or legal ideas to “perpetually open philosophical questions.”   References Caputo, J. D., & Vattimo, G. (2012) The Last Steps of Faith (M. Soleimani, Trans.). Tehran: Elm. [In Persian/Farsi] Derrida, J. (1976) Of Grammatology (G. C. Spivak, Trans.). Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Derrida, J. (1981) Dissemination (B. Johnson, Trans.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Derrida, J. (1992) The Other Heading: Reflections on Today's Europe. Indiana University Press. Derrida, J. (1994) Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. Routledge. Derrida, J. (2005) Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (P.-A. Brault & M. Naas, Trans.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. De Saussure, F. (2024) Course in General Linguistics (K. Safavi, Trans.). Tehran: Hermes. [In Persian/Farsi] De Saussure, F. (2015) “Foundations of Structuralism in Linguistics”, in F. Sajoudi (Trans.), Collection on Structuralism, Post-Structuralism, and Literary Studies. Tehran: Sooreh Mehr. [In Persian/Farsi] Derrida, J. (1996) Of Grammatology, [in Persian translation not cited]. [In Persian/Farsi] Fellaton, J. (2019) The Dictionary of Derrida (M. Parsa, Trans.). Tehran: Shunod. [In Persian/Farsi] Heimsoeth, H. (1994) The Six Great Themes of Western Metaphysics and the End of the Middle Ages. Detroit: Wayne State University Press. Kearney, R. (1984) Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Plato. (2022) Complete Works, Vol. 3 (M. H. Lotfi, Trans.). Tehran: Khwarazmi. [In Persian/Farsi] Rashidian, A. K. (2023) Derrida in Context. Tehran: Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Saakert, K. H. (2022) Postmodern Platos (S. J. Sameh et al., Trans.). Tehran: Tarjoman Olum-e Ensani. [In Persian/Farsi]           <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. <a href="mailto:h.aliakbarzadeh@ut.ac.ir">h.aliakbarzadeh@ut.ac.ir</a>امر سیاسی در اندیشه ژاک دریدا پیوند وثیقی با ایده او در فلسفه و متافیزیک دارد. دریدا معتقد است که اندیشه و هستی بافتی زبانی دارند و هر دو را به مثابه یک متن تلقی میکند. در نگاه او ایده فلسفی باید امکان انضمامیت داشته باشد و انضمامیت برای دریدا با دانش «گراماتولوژی» ممکن میشود، دانشی که هم شرط امکان تلقی هستی به مثابه یک متن است و هم امکان فراروی از «متافیزیک حضور» را – که به نوعی تمام تاریخ موردانتقادِ متافیزیک غرب برای دریداست- فراهم میکند. با گراماتولوژی، ساحتهای انضمامی مانند ساحتِ دیگری، سیاست، عدالت، دموکراسی، جامعه، اقتصاد، حقوق بشر و بسیار از مفاهیم امروزین کشف میشود. به اعتقاد دریدا گذار از گفتار/حضور به نوشتار/غیاب و توغل در دانش گراماتولوژی، به مثابه یک رویکرد کلی نسبت به زبان، امکان انضمامیت فلسفه در دوره پسامدرن را فراهم میکند. البته سیاستِ دریدایی بیش از آنکه طرحی مشخص، جزئی و سیستماتیک باشد و به جای آنکه پیادهسازی شود، انگیزه، شور و شوق میآفریند. سیاست در این نگاه، یک سیاستِ تحققناپذیر است، «سیاستِ بدون سیاست» است، سیاستی است که سیستماتیک نیست، اما نویدی است برای عدالت و دموکراسی، چیزی که دریدا از آن با تعبیر «دموکراسیِ در راه» یاد میکند.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/50154

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922Examining the Relationship between State Structure and the Electoral Institution in Iran (1906–1979)بررسی نسبت ساخت دولت و نهاد انتخابات در ایران (1285-1357)299326faمهدی زیبائیدانشیار گروه علوم سیاسی دانشگاه بین‌المللی امام خمینی(ره)، ایران orcid 0000000156008552حاکمقاسمیدانشیار علوم سیاسی، دانشکده علوم اجتماعی، دانشگاه بین¬المللی امام خمینی(ره) قزوین، ایران 0000-0001-8714-8611 سیدهادی عظیمیدانشجوی دکتری دانشگاه بین¬المللی امام خمینی(ره)، قزوین، ایران 2025111Examining the Relationship between State Structure and the Electoral Institution in Iran (1906–1979)   Mehdi Zibaei<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Hakim Ghasemi<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a> Seyed Hadi Azimi<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">***</a>   The present study seeks to answer the question: What impact did the structure of power have on the institution of elections during the Constitutional era? It appears that due to historical contexts and the imbalance of power resources, the structure of power in Iran rendered the institution of elections meaningless. Between the years 1906 to 1979, the power structure prevented the formation of free and fair elections through which the people could express their will by electing parliamentary representatives. This paper aims to examine the relationship between state formation and the establishment of the electoral institution in Iran during the period between the Constitutional and Islamic revolutions, through a combined lens of historical sociology’s theory of the state and Michel Foucault’s concept of “biopower.”   Keywords: State formation, electoral institution, Constitutional Revolution, Islamic Revolution, social power.   Introduction The Constitutional Revolution was a significant step toward making the institution of government accountable to the people’s representatives. According to the constitutional law, the elected parliament supervised the government and could question and dismiss it. Elections were the most prominent feature of the constitutional system, through which the National Consultative Assembly, elected by the people, was to be formed as a representative body within Iran’s power structure, legislating and overseeing the pillars of power. Both the National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, under the constitutional law, had the right to supervise, question, and impeach the government. The structure of power in Iran has a historical background and has always, for various reasons, taken on a personal and tribal form. After the Constitutional Revolution, the power structure faced new conditions. The constitutional movement sought to limit and make power accountable through law and to establish the parliament as the representative of the nation. On one hand, the power structure, in order to preserve itself, reproduced pre-constitutional relations under the guise of constitutionalism. On the other hand, parliamentarians and legal activists, at least until the late 1930s, tried to achieve free and genuine elections. This paper aims to answer the question: “What impact did the structure of power have on the institution of elections during the Constitutional era?” Therefore, the relationship between the power structure and the electoral institution from the Constitutional Revolution to the Islamic Revolution will be examined through a hybrid model combining the theory of the state in historical sociology and Michel Foucault’s concept of “biopower.”   Method This paper draws freely from the views of Michael Mann, Michel Foucault, and Homayoun Katouzian, combining elements from their theories to outline a model for the relationship between power structure and elections in Iran. According to Michael Mann’s theory, the structure of power is formed based on a fourfold model of political, economic, ideological, and military power. If these four powers are balanced and independent social classes emerge from the state through the electoral institution, a form of biopower arises whose goal is to preserve, multiply, and strengthen life. This leads to the formation and continuation of an institutional statism model. In the absence of balance among the four powers—due to lack of continuity, absence of social classes, and absence of politics—no change occurs in the power structure or the autocratic government of Iran. In such a case, elections become a process for producing and reproducing the mere structure of autocratic power. This model results in the formation of a genuine elitism model.   Findings and Argument This paper shows that a balance among the types of power in Iran after the Constitutional Revolution could have favorably emerged and created the conditions for free and inclusive elections only if the interests of political, social, military, and ideological powers simultaneously aligned with the electoral mechanism as a means of transferring power. Such agreement, in conditions where these powers lacked the necessary capacity to act and resist despotism, could have served as a barrier against other powers. According to the findings of this article, one of the most significant obstacles to forming an institutional statism model was the lack of appropriate mechanisms in the constitution to support democrats and advocates of free elections in confronting military power. The absence of strategies to organize supporters of institutional statism also made consensus among various powers against military dominance impossible. Neglecting the importance of the ideological power of the clergy and religious institutions in shaping the power structure was another issue that emerged after the Constitutional Revolution. This imbalance of power paved the way for the formation of a genuine elitism model throughout much of the period from the Constitutional Revolution to the Islamic Revolution. Thus, in the years following the Constitutional Revolution, the power structure lacked the capacity to institutionalize genuine elections.   Conclusion Despite the efforts of constitutionalists to establish and institutionalize the electoral institution, the imbalance among the four powers during the years 1906 to 1925 and again from 1941 to 1953 ended with the dominance of military power. Consequently, constitutionalists failed to achieve an institutional statism model based on biopower through elections. The dominance of military power over ideological, economic, and political powers led to Reza Khan ascending the throne in 1925 and Mohammad Reza Pahlavi neutralizing the electoral institution through the 1953 coup, turning parliament into a branch of the royal court. This trend resulted in genuine elitism governing most of the Constitutional era. The lack of powerful economic institutions capable of resisting the ruling power, the absence of efforts by ideological power to pursue free and genuine elections, and the weakness of military power were the main factors preventing the continuation of the free election experience. These factors rendered the alignment between law and societal demands irrelevant. Throughout the 72-year history of the Constitutional era, the electoral institution, under the shadow of biopower rooted in autocratic government, lost its ability to limit ruling power and had only a short-lived existence.   References Abadian, H. (2009). Old concepts and new thought: A theoretical introduction to Iran’s constitutionalism. Kavir. [In Persian/Farsi] Abrahamian, E. (1998). Iran between two revolutions: An introduction to the political sociology of contemporary Iran. Nashr-e Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Azghandi, S. A. (2008). Political and social developments in Iran (1941–1979). SAMT. [In Persian/Farsi] Bashiriyeh, H. (2001). Obstacles to political development in Iran. Gam-e No. [In Persian/Farsi] Fakhruddin, A. (1995). The crisis of democracy in Iran (A. H. Mahdavi & B. Nowzari, Trans.). Alborz. [In Persian/Farsi] Foucault, M. (2011). The birth of biopolitics: Collège de France lectures 1978–1979 (R. Najafzadeh, Trans.). Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Firouhi, D. (2012). Jurisprudence and politics in contemporary Iran: Political jurisprudence and constitutional jurisprudence. Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Firouhi, D. (2014). Jurisprudence and politics in contemporary Iran: Transformation of governance and Islamic political jurisprudence. Nashr-e Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Jafari Nedoushan, A. A., & Zarei Mahmoudabadi, H. (2003). Multiple revisions in the constitutional law. Islamic Revolution Document Center. [In Persian/Farsi] Katouzian, M. A. (2010). State and society in Iran: The fall of the Qajar and the rise of the Pahlavi (H. Afshar, Trans.). Markaz. [In Persian/Farsi] Katouzian, M. A. (2011). State and society in Iran: The fall of the Qajar and the rise of the Pahlavi (H. Afshar, Trans.). Markaz. [In Persian/Farsi] Katouzian, M. A. (2016). Iran: A short-term society and three other essays (A. Kowsari, Trans.). Nashr-e Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Majles Research Center. (2006). Introduction to the history of legislative assemblies in Iran (19th term, June 1956 – June 1960). Majles Research Center Website. [In Persian/Farsi] Makki, H. (1945). Twenty-year history of Iran. Elmi. [In Persian/Farsi] Malayi Tavani, A. (2002). The National Consultative Assembly and the consolidation of Reza Shah’s dictatorship. Islamic Revolution Document Center. [In Persian/Farsi] Morvarid, Y. (1998). A look at the legislative assemblies during the constitutional era. Ohadi. [In Persian/Farsi] Rahnama, A. (2005). Religious forces in the context of the national movement. Gam-e No. [In Persian/Farsi] Rasakh, G., Sadat Sharifi, F., & Khodami, A. (2021). Analysis of economic power during the Qajar era from the perspective of Michael Mann’s social sources. Historical Sociology, 13(2), 179–215. [In Persian/Farsi] Semii, A. (2018). Power struggle in Iran: Why and how did the clergy win? Nashr-e Ney. [In Persian/Farsi] Shajiei, Z. (1993). Political elites in Iran (from constitutionalism to the Islamic Revolution). Sokhan. [In Persian/Farsi] Vijeh, M. R., & Ghahvehchian, H. (2012). An analysis of the 1906 electoral law of the National Consultative Assembly. Contemporary Comparative Law Studies, 2(5), 195–226. [In Persian/Farsi] Zibaei, M. (2021). The emergence of the modern state in the Middle East from a historical sociology perspective. State Studies Quarterly, 7(28), 33–58. [In Persian/Farsi]       <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Corresponding Author: Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, Imam Khomeini International University, Iran. zibaei@soc.ikiu.ac.ir <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> Associate Professor of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran. ghasemi@ikiu.ac.ir <a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">***</a> PhD Student, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran. azimiseyedhadi@yahoo.comپژوهش حاضر به دنبال پاسخگویی به این پرسش هست که ساخت قدرت، چه تأثیری بر نهاد انتخابات در طول دوران مشروطه گذاشت؟ به نظر میرسد ساخت قدرت در ایران به دلیل زمینههای تاریخی و عدم توازن منابع قدرت، نهاد انتخابات را فاقد معنا نموده، ساختار قدرت در طول سالهای 1285 تا 1357 مانع شکلگیری انتخابات آزاد و منصفانهای شده است که بر اساس آن مردم بتوانند رأی و نظر خود را از طریق انتخاب آزاد و منصفانه نمایندگان مجلس تبلور بخشند. در نوشتار پیش&zwnj; رو، سعی بر آن است که ارتباط بین تشکیل دولت و تأسیس نهاد انتخابات در ایران، طی بازه زمانی بین دو انقلاب مشروطه و اسلامی، در پرتو ترکیبی از نظریه دولت در جامعهشناسی تاریخی و مفهوم «زیست قدرت» میشل فوکو بررسی شود.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/49161

مرکز منطقه ای اطلاع رسانی علوم و فناوریپژوهش سیاست نظری2008-579620372025922COVID-19 and Its Impacts on the Concept of Citizenshipکرونا و تأثیرات آن بر مفهوم شهروندی 327353faبهراماخوان کاظمیاستاد گروه علوم سیاسی دانشگاه شیراز، ایران 0000-0003-3869-0257سید جوادصالحیدانشیار گروه روابط بین‌الملل دانشگاه تهران، ایران حسینمحسنیدانش‌آموخته دکتری علوم سیاسی دانشگاه شیراز، ایران ORCID: 0000-0001-5713-431520231126COVID-19 and Its Impacts on the                            Concept of Citizenship         Bahram Akhavan Kazemi<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">*</a> Seyyed Javad Salehi<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">**</a> Hossein Mohseni<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">***</a>   The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in late 2019 in China and its subsequent global spread acted as a challenge to humanity and its political and social life. The central research question is: What impacts has the COVID-19 pandemic had on the concept of citizenship? In response, it can be said that COVID-19 severely affected the four pillars of citizenship and created conditions that called the idea of stable citizenship into question. In other words, regarding the two pillars of membership and participation, its effects were such that they cannot be classified within either of the two models of republican or liberal citizenship. On the other hand, it increased the burden of citizens’ duties and obligations, emphasizing responsibilities over rights, which strengthened the model of republican citizenship. The research method is explanatory-analytical, and the data collection method is library-based and internet-based.   Keywords: Coronavirus, citizenship, membership, rights, duties.   Introduction In the early days of 2020, the world experienced a new pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus. One of the most important concepts affected by the COVID-19 pandemic was citizenship. Therefore, the authors first aim to present an analytical-theoretical framework regarding the concept of citizenship and, using an explanatory-analytical method and library and internet sources, examine how this impact has occurred.   Research Background In this regard, it can be stated that numerous studies have been conducted, such as Citizenship in Times of Pandemic and The Importance of Citizenship and Competence in COVID-19 Treatment, among others. However, a study specifically addressing the topic of the present article has not yet been conducted. Based on this, the present research can be considered highly innovative in terms of both subject and content.   Theoretical Foundations: Citizenship and Its Four Pillars In general, despite the many dimensions of citizenship, four main and fundamental pillars can be identified: Membership: The first element in the discussion of citizenship is membership. In other words, citizenship is the same as membership in the political community. It can be said that the issue of membership lies at the center of the concept of citizenship, and in its specific meaning, it reflects the individual’s participation in society for the purpose of shaping their community. Rights: Rights are crucial for successfully addressing major governance issues, such as the need for fair resource distribution and maintaining order. The importance of rights lies in granting political agency to individuals and recognizing them as worthy of respect and attention. Duties: The concept of citizenship contains a paradox; that is, this concept encompasses not only rights but also duties and obligations. Therefore, citizens must assume responsibilities in relation to their citizenship rights. Participation: The fourth pillar of citizenship is participation. Political participation is central for linking rights and responsibilities.     Analysis of the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Citizenship COVID-19 and Citizenship Membership To combat the spread of the disease, many countries moved away from multilateralism and pursued more protectionist and nationalist policies. The mobilization of state power in response to the spread of COVID-19 led to the exclusion of some individuals and the inclusion of others. Activities that constitute citizenship itself came under pressure due to the pandemic. Furthermore, in all areas affected by the pandemic, civil registration and asylum procedures were disrupted. On the other hand, travel restrictions undoubtedly limited what can be called one of the “markets” of citizenship—that is, markets related to easy citizenship or “birthright citizenship.”   COVID-19 and Citizenship Rights In the situation created by the COVID-19 pandemic, many civil, political, social, and cultural rights were suspended. For instance, rights such as freedom of movement, access to information, and transparency were significantly undermined. Therefore, it can be said that the pandemic temporarily facilitated a shift from rights to duties, emphasizing obligations over rights. Only rights such as the right to health were strongly prioritized, while other dimensions were somewhat marginalized (though not entirely).   COVID-19 and Citizenship Duties With the outbreak of COVID-19, a clear increase in citizens’ duties and obligations became evident, particularly as legal obligations. During the pandemic, legal duties generally outweighed moral or ethical responsibilities. Citizens who failed to comply with quarantine measures faced various fines and penalties.   COVID-19 and Citizenship Participation It can be argued that a pandemic like COVID-19 forces both individuals and governments to prioritize decision-making without citizen participation over decisions based on shared contractual rationality. In other words, since the government’s duty is to maintain security and protect citizens’ health, it cannot wait for public consensus on how to respond to a widespread crisis. Consequently, with the increasing spread of COVID-19 and rising mortality rates worldwide, the rights of citizens in relation to participation in urban or civic politics were effectively set aside.   Conclusion Given these developments, a central question arises: in light of the pandemic’s effects on the four dimensions of citizenship, which direction has citizenship taken—toward the republican or liberal model? Regarding membership, which is foundational to citizenship, both liberal and republican traditions emphasize it, although they differ in implementation. The pandemic disrupted these mechanisms, placing membership outside the conventional frameworks of both models. Regarding rights and duties, the liberal model prioritizes individual rights, emphasizing individual autonomy over collective obligations, whereas the republican model prioritizes societal duties over individual rights. The pandemic reinforced the republican emphasis on duties, as citizens’ responsibilities increased. Finally, participation, a key dimension in both liberal and republican models, was weakened during the pandemic. Given that both models rely on active citizen engagement, participation under COVID-19 cannot be fully classified within either framework. Overall, the pandemic highlighted a shift in citizenship toward the republican model in terms of duties and rights while simultaneously limiting participation in ways not accounted for by traditional models.   References Abbasi, M., et al. (2020) “The COVID-19 Pandemic: From Human Rights Considerations to Citizenship Obligations”, Medical Law, 14(55), pp.7–22. [In Persian/Farsi] Akhavan Kazemi, B., & Mohseni, H. (2023) “Analyzing the Negative and Positive Effects of Pandemics on the Political Sphere: With Emphasis on COVID-19”, Strategic Policy Research, 12(44), pp.197–232. [In Persian/Farsi] Boon Lim, S. (2021) “The Right or Wrong to the City? Understanding Citizen Participation in the Pre- and Post-COVID-19 Eras in Malaysia”, Journal of Open Innovation: Technology, Market, and Complexity, 7(238), pp.1–18. Brown, K., & Wang, R. C. (2020) “Politics and Science: The Case of China and the Coronavirus”, Asian Affairs, 51(2), pp.247–264. Davis, M., & Lowina, L. (2020) Pandemic, People, and Narrative (E. Yazdanpour, Trans.). Tehran: Institute for Cultural and Social Studies. [In Persian/Farsi] Eli Gasht. (2020) “Border Closures Following the Spread of the Coronavirus”. Available at: <a href="https://www.eligasht.com/Blog/travelguide/">https://www.eligasht.com/Blog/travelguide/</a> [In Persian/Farsi] Finders, M. V. (2020) “Democracy and the Politics of Coronavirus: Trust, Blame and Understanding”, Parliamentary Affairs, 74(2), pp.1–17. Gharib, M. (2020) “The Pandemic Is Not Good for Freedom and Democracy. But There Are Exceptions”, NPR, November 10. Available at: https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/11/10/930464419/report-th-pandemic-is-not-good-for-freedom-and-democracy-but-there-are-exceptio Gozdecka, D. A. (2021) “Human Rights During the Pandemic: COVID-19 and Securitisation of Health”, Nordic Journal of Human Rights, 39(3), pp.205–223. Helbling, M., Maxwell, R., Munzert, S., & Traunmüller, R. (2022) “The Importance of Citizenship for Deserving COVID-19 Treatment”, Humanities & Social Sciences Communications, 9(1), pp.1–8. Hosseini, S. R. (2020) “The COVID-19 Pandemic Crisis and the Necessity of the Moral Reproduction of Human Freedom in Political Theology”, Contemporary Political Essays, 11(4), pp.97–114. [In Persian/Farsi] IDEA. (2020) Taking Stock of Global Democratic Trends Before and During the COVID-19 Pandemic. Available at: https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/global-democratic-trends-before-and-during-covid-19-pandemic.pdf [December 2020] ICNL. (2020) U.S. Current Trend: COVID-19 and Civic Freedom, March 2020. Available at: <a href="https://www.icnl.org/post/analysis/u-s-current-trend-covid-19-and-civic-freedom">https://www.icnl.org/post/analysis/u-s-current-trend-covid-19-and-civic-freedom</a> Javid, M. J., & Ebrahimi, M. (2013) “Citizenship Duties in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran”, Journal of Public Law Studies, 2(2), pp.25–46. [In Persian/Farsi] Kashtelz, S., & Davidson, A. (2003) Migration and Citizenship (F. Taghilu, Trans.). Tehran: Strategic Studies Research Center. [In Persian/Farsi] Kazempour, L. (2012) The Impact of Globalization on the Concept of Citizenship (Master’s thesis, Supervisor: Dr. H. Ghasemi), Imam Khomeini International University, Faculty of Social Sciences. [In Persian/Farsi] Kruman, M., & Marback, R. (2022) “Citizenship in Pandemic Times”, Citizenship Studies, 26(8), pp.1027–1031. Maschiz, B. (2020) COVID-19 and the Clash of Civilizations, Digital Publication. [In Persian/Farsi] Mercel, W. (2020) “Who Governs in Deep Crises? The Case of Germany”, Democratic Theory, 7(2), pp.1–11. Mohseni, H. (2020) “Analyzing the Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Good Governance: A Global Experience”, Contemporary Political Essays, 11(4), pp.339–359. [In Persian/Farsi] Moghaddam Heydari, G. (2021) “Pandemic, Quarantine, and Medical Politics”, Philosophy of Science, 11(1), pp.195–209. [In Persian/Farsi] Mir, S., et al. (2020) “Citizenship Rights and Social Communication Rights during and after COVID-19”, Journal of Journalism and Communications Law, 2(3), pp.115–141. [In Persian/Farsi] Naderi, N. (2019) A Study of Citizenship Rights Policies in the Governments of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani (Master’s thesis, Supervisor: Dr. M. A. Tavana), University of Yazd, Faculty of Humanities. [In Persian/Farsi] Pelleu, R. (1991) Citizen and State (A. Ghazi, Trans.). Tehran: University of Tehran. [In Persian/Farsi] Piredda, P. (2022) “The Use of Foucault’s and Schmitt’s Theories and War Metaphors in the Political Narratives of the COVID-19 Pandemic”, Interface, Available at: <a href="https://interface.org.tw/index.php/if/article/view/183/542">https://interface.org.tw/index.php/if/article/view/183/542</a> Safaei, M. M., & Parvaz, F. (2021) “Legal and Ethical Duties of Coronavirus Carriers and Ethical-Legal Considerations in Dealing with Them”, Proceedings of the Conference on Coronavirus in the Mirror of the Qur’an and Legal-Jurisprudential Thoughts, Yasouj University, pp.1–11. [In Persian/Farsi] Shafi’i Seifabadi, M., & Bagheri Dowlatabadi, A. (2020) “Understanding the Realities and Social Impacts of the COVID-19 Crisis Based on Niklas Luhmann’s Social Systems Theory”, Interdisciplinary Human Sciences Studies, 12(2), pp.55–90. [In Persian/Farsi] Saperstein, E. (2023) Global Citizenship in a COVID-19 World. Available at: <a href="https://www.henleyglobal.com/">https://www.henleyglobal.com/</a> Shaw, J. (2021) “Citizenship and COVID-19: Syndemic Effects”, German Law Journal, 22, pp.1635–1660. Sikkink, K. (2020) “Rights and Responsibilities in the Coronavirus Pandemic”, Available at: <a href="https://www.openglobalrights.org/">https://www.openglobalrights.org/</a> Taylor, S. (2019) The Psychology of Pandemics. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Tognotti, E. (2013) “Lessons from the History of Quarantine, from Plague to Influenza A”, Historical Review, 19(2), pp.254–259. Tavana, M. A. (2009) Global Citizenship in the Era of Globalization: An Intercultural Approach (Doctoral dissertation, Supervisor: Dr. A. H. Beheshti), Tarbiat Modares University, Faculty of Humanities. [In Persian/Farsi] Tavana, M., et al. (2008) Global Citizenship (K. Dalfrooz, Trans.). Tehran: Kavir. [In Persian/Farsi] You, J. (2020) “Lessons from South Korea’s COVID-19 Policy Response”, American Review of Public Administration, 50(6–7), pp.801–808. Zizek, S. (2020) COVID-19 Shakes the World (N. Gorgin, Trans.). Tehran: Shabkhiz. [In Persian/Farsi]       <a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">*</a> Professor, Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, Iran. kazemi@shirazu.ac.ir Professor, Department of Political Science, Shiraz University, Iran. kazemi@shirazu.ac.ir <a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">**</a> Corresponding author: Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Tehran, Iran. S.javad.salehi@ut.ac.ir            <a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">***</a> Ph.D Student, Political Science, Shiraz University, Iran. <a href="mailto:Hoseinmohseni52@gmail.com">Hoseinmohseni52@gmail.com</a>رخداد پاندمی کرونا در اواخر سال 2019 در چین و گسترش آن در عرصه جهانی، به&zwnj;مثابه چالشگر بشر و حیات سیاسی و اجتماعی او عمل کرد. سؤال محوری پژوهش این است که پاندمی&zwnj;کرونا چه تأثیراتی بر مقوله شهروندی داشته است؟ در پاسخ می&zwnj;توان گفت که کرونا ارکان چهارگانه شهروندی را به &zwnj;شدت تحت &zwnj;تأثیر قرار داد و شرایطی را فراهم آورد که ایده ثبات شهروندی را زیر سؤال برد. به تعبیری، در دو رکن عضویت و مشارکت، تأثیرات آن به &zwnj;گونه&zwnj;ای بود که نمی&zwnj;توان آن را در هیچ&zwnj;کدام از دو مدل شهروندی جمهوری&zwnj;گرا و لیبرال طبقه&zwnj;بندی کرد و از طرف دیگر بار تکالیف و وظایف شهروندان را سنگین کرده و بیش از آنکه بر حق&zwnj;ها تأکید شود، بر وظایف و تکالیف شهروندان تکیه می&zwnj;شد؛ امری که موجب تقویت الگوی شهروند جمهوری&zwnj;گرا شد. روش پژوهش، تبیینی- تحلیلی و روش گردآوری اطلاعات نیز کتابخانه&zwnj;ای- اینترنتی است.

http://political.ihss.ac.ir/ar/Article/Download/44850